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that is centered on the ability of owners to appropriate the benefits of their assets in the face of a threat from
numerous potential adversaries, rather than their ability to contract such assets away within a bilateral context.
This appropriability problem, it is argued, is a defining concept of private property regimes; it is not just one of
many problems underlying private property, but rather the systemic problem that underlies property regimes,
defines them and should serve as the measuring stick by which they should be assessed. The paper
demonstrates how the shift to a multilateral, appropriability-based analysis allows for a fuller account of what
must be the "core" or "baseline" of property rights. Using this account, the paper offers an evaluation of the
relationship between such "core" rights and other types of rights traditionally associated with property
doctrine, such as rights that have historically been granted to owners under the guise of property rights,
contractual rights vis-a-vis third parties and constitutional rights against the public at large.
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INTRODUCTION
The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is
done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under
the sun.
Ecclesiastes 1:9

In recent decades, property notions have become increasingly
amorphous.
Centuries-old doctrines that centered on the
relationship between individuals and assets—doctrines that have
allowed courts to develop relatively quick, workable rules of decision
that apply to a vast majority of property cases—have been replaced by
the notion of property as an undetermined “bundle of rights” that
are, by and large, interpersonal and serve only one major purpose—
1
as a basis for contract. These bundles of use rights, as shaped by
courts and analyzed in academia, have gradually become much more
malleable and much more susceptible to private ordering—indeed,
much more reminiscent of bilateral contractual rights—than any
traditional concept of property rights.
The growing malleability of property rights and their increasing
susceptibility to private ordering can be traced back to the
introduction of the Law and Economics movement into the property
law field, and specifically to the paradigm shift brought about by
Ronald Coase’s analysis of the laws of nuisance in his seminal work
2
The Problem of Social Cost. Coase’s focus on bilateral disputes over use
rights, coupled with his suggestion (which is itself based on a bilateral
analysis) that the initial allocation of property rights is typically
1. In speaking about a “bundle of rights” in this paper, I refer specifically to the
notion that property is simply a label that can be placed on any given set of rights
that can be the basis for contract, and not the much older notion that complete
ownership of a well-specified “thing” can be fragmented among multiple people
(e.g., where one person holds a life estate and another holds a remainder estate, the
aggregate of which would create a fee simple). See, e.g., Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of
Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) (“Labeling something as property does not
predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.”).
2. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960);
see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359–60 (2001) (attributing to Coase’s article the shift in
the conception of property away from a traditional view to one where property is
thought of as a list of use rights).

2009]

APPROPRIABILITY AND PROPERTY

1419

dependent on ad hoc relationships between neighbors (or, in the
absence of prohibitive transaction costs, simply immaterial) led many
to conclude that property rights have neither a set “core,” or
3
“baseline,” nor a clear outer limit. According to this view, property
rights are shaped and re-shaped seriatim by parties to bilateral
transactions in a manner that is almost indistinguishable from that of
4
contractual rights.
The bundle of rights model offers a deficient account of property
rights for several reasons. First, it offers a poor account of the
“thingness” of property—i.e., the connection between property rights
and the “thing” that is owned—without any clear explanation as to
why this notion is wrong or how it remained intact through several
centuries of property jurisprudence. Second, it is predicated first and
foremost on a bilateral model that is far removed from traditional
property analysis. A third and related problem is that the bundle of
rights metaphor has a tenuous connection, at best, to the basic
problems that property regimes are intended to solve; although
clearly defined property rights are a necessary predicate to
contractual negotiations, the ability to contract is not the basic
problem property regimes seek to address.

3. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-29, 97100 (1977) (noting that while a “Layman” may cling to traditional notions of
property as well-defined rights to things, the “Scientific” view of property as a bundle
of relational rights is so pervasive that “even the dimmest law student can be counted
upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command”); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration
of Property, in 22 NOMOS: Property 69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1980) (noting the disintegration of traditional notions of property among
“specialists,” such as lawyers and economists); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 737–39 (1998) (discussing the current
predominance of the “bundle of rights” conception of property). It should be noted
that although Coase’s work may have dealt the final death blow to any “fixed” notion
of property, the initial shift in the concept of property—from a right in things
towards a set of interpersonal relationships—predates Coase, and is usually
attributed to Hohfeld’s seminal works dealing more generally with legal
relationships. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV. 537 (1913); see also, e.g.,
Williams, supra note 1, at 297 (“Hohfeld argued that property rights do not define
absolute dominion of people over things, but instead define shifting relationships
among people.”); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century:
The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 330 (1980)
(noting that the Hohfeldian analysis defined property as “a set of legal relations
among persons,” the meaning of which varied from case to case). For a recent and
slightly more attenuated account of the indeterminability of property rights, see
Hanoch Dagan, Exclusion and Inclusion in Property (Tel Aviv Univ. Legal Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 109, 2009), available at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/
fp/art109.
4. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 359–60 (“Coase implied that property has
no function other than to serve as the baseline for contracting . . . .”).
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In fact, in their simplest form, property regimes are aimed at
attaining, ensuring, and enforcing the ability of owners to
appropriate the benefits that flow from their assets. It is therefore
appropriability, and not any ability to contract, that should inform
our judgment concerning the optimal scope of property rights. Once
this rationale for—and purpose of—property rights is realized, the
fallacy of any bilateral analysis of property rights becomes clear:
because property rights are intended to ensure the security of owners
against a threat emanating from an undefined class of putative
poachers—a class that is comprised of numerous potential
members—property rights must be analyzed in a multilateral model.
The shift to such a multilateral analysis demonstrates the
shortcomings of the “bundle of rights” model and requires the
development of a more complete theory about what must be the
“core” or “baseline” of property rights. In addition, this shift allows
us to better evaluate the relationship between such “core” or
“baseline” rights and other types of rights—namely, (1) additional
rights that have historically been granted to owners under the guise
of property rights, (2) contractual rights vis-à-vis third parties, or
(3) rights against the public at large.
This Article offers a first glimpse at the implications of an
appropriability-based analysis of property rights. Parts I and II define
the appropriability problem and offer an overview of the role of
appropriability, as defined in property law. Parts III through V then
demonstrate the implications of the appropriability analysis in three
discrete areas of property law. Part III demonstrates how the
appropriability analysis and its resulting multilateral model
undermine the indeterminacy of the “bundle of rights” model and
require a baseline notion of property that is intricately tied to the
“thing” that is owned. Part IV demonstrates how the appropriability
analysis accounts for the distinction between property and
contractual rights. Specifically, Part IV focuses on the law of
servitudes and the appropriability-based justification for the common
law distinction between servitudes on land and servitudes on other
types of assets. Finally, Part V demonstrates the implications of the
appropriability analysis on the law of takings, and specifically
on the distinction between compensable and noncompensable
governmental takings.

2009]

APPROPRIABILITY AND PROPERTY
I.

1421

ON APPROPRIABILITY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

A. Appropriability and Private Property—The Basics
Property rights are generally thought of (in economic terms) as
legal instruments that are used to incentivize efficient use of scarce
5
resources. Their incentivizing mechanism works by aligning usage of
resources with its resulting costs and benefits; property rights ensure
that users of resources will both enjoy (i.e., appropriate) as large a
share as possible of the benefits that flow from such use, and bear as
much as possible of the costs that are associated with such use.
This, in turn, prevents over-usage or under-usage of resources by
bringing the relevant costs and benefits associated with a given use to
bear on the user’s decision-making processes. In economic parlance,
we usually say that property rights help internalize externalities that
arise when benefits associated with the efficient use of resources—or
costs associated with the inefficient use thereof—are not captured (or
borne) by the actual user of the resource, but are instead captured by
neighbors, strangers, or the public at large. Externalities, therefore,

5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 2003)
(“[L]egal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources
efficiently.”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 348 (1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives
to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”).
The proposition that property is essentially an economic institution is itself not
trivial; in fact, many argue that it is an oversimplification of the reasons for, and
justifications of, property rights. The debate over the viability and exclusivity of
economic justifications for property rights generally, and for private property
regimes specifically, goes well beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Harold
Demsetz, Professor Michelman’s Unnecessary and Futile Search for the Philosopher’s
Touchstone, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 41, 45 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (arguing that “[p]rivate property allows
the market to weigh and compare the beneficial and harmful effects . . . and to filter
out actions that would yield a net loss”); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the
Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW, supra, at 3, 3 (arguing that
“not even a presumptive preference for the rudiments of private property . . . is
obtainable by economic reason”); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
102–05 (1988) (arguing for a rights-based justification for private property regimes
under a Hegelian approach); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998)
(warning against the possibility that resources will be underused when rights to
scarce resources are fragmented under private property regimes); Andrei Shleifer,
State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135–36 (1998) (advocating for
the benefits of private property over state ownership from an economic perspective).
Whatever the philosophical rationales for property may be, as a matter of positive
law, under United States law, at least, intellectual property rights have to be justified
in welfare terms because Congress’s power to grant exclusive rights in “Writings and
Discoveries” may be used for only one purpose: “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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distort the cost-benefit analysis of the actual user regarding the
6
optimal level of usage.
7
Under-usage, as opposed to over-usage, can usually be explained
in terms of an appropriability problem. Consider, for example, the
case of a farmer who puts time and money into raising cattle. The
farmer seeks out the best grazing grounds, breeds the best possible
cattle, and erects fences to fend off predators that threaten her herd.
The farmer finds, however, that the cattle she raised are taken away
by her neighbors before she can either market them or use them
herself. Absent property rights, this phenomenon would not be
considered “stealing” or “poaching,” and the farmer would arguably
have no legal redress. Under these circumstances, and assuming this
pattern of conduct by the farmer’s neighbors was recurring, the
farmer would likely cease raising cattle altogether, regardless of the
fact that the milk and meat she produced were far more valuable
than her investment in producing them (thereby making her
investment efficient). Instead, the farmer would probably channel
the resources she can utilize to some other, less efficient use, such as
growing a crop which is less susceptible to taking by her neighbors.
An efficient use of resources (land, expert labor, etc.) would thus be
hindered due to the farmer’s inability to appropriate the benefits of
such use, giving rise to what is customarily referred to as an
appropriability problem.
Private property regimes seek to prevent such under-usage of
resources by employing multiple legal protections (manifested as
specific prohibitions under tort and criminal law) that, in the
aggregate, award users of resources some approximation of
Blackstone’s idea regarding “that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,
6. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, supra note 5, at 348. I use the term
“externalities” in the limited sense just mentioned, i.e., in reference to relevant
considerations that are external to the decision-making process, regardless of any
judgment as to who should ultimately bear such costs or enjoy such benefits.
Spillovers of benefits are referred to as “positive externalities”; spillovers of costs are
referred to as “negative externalities.” These, of course, are relative terms; here,
I use them relative to the ultimate decision maker regarding a specific use.
7. Over-usage is usually attributed to “tragedy of the commons” situations,
where joint users of scarce resources bear the costs associated with their use jointly
but enjoy the benefits of their use individually. In such situations, “[e]ach man is
locked into a system that compels him to increase his [usage of the joint resource]
without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest . . . .” Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968); see also Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, supra note 5, at 351–53 (offering an externalities-based explanation for the
emergence of private property regimes that superseded common ownership of
hunting grounds in certain Native American communities).
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in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
8
universe.” Under private property regimes, resources are parceled
out and allocated to individual owners, legal barriers are erected
between the parcels, and the power of the state is harnessed to ensure
that owners have exclusive access to benefits flowing from their
assets—in other words, that they have the ability to appropriate the
9
fruits of these assets. When resources are parceled out in this way,
owners have a clear incentive to maximize the benefits that flow from
them, because they stand to enjoy those increased benefits
themselves.
Going back to the example, our hypothetical farmer would be
willing to put considerable investment into her privately-owned cattle
ranch. This is exactly where appropriability comes into play: under a
private property regime, the farmer would be able to appropriate the
milk or meat that she produces, and therefore, as long as she expects
8. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. The notion of absolute exclusive
powers vested in the owner of property is obviously false, nor was it ever considered
completely true—even by Blackstone himself. See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property
Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1998) (noting that “the famous
definition was only a point of departure” from which the notion of property as
exclusive dominion was discussed, deconstructed, and attenuated).
Recent
commentators have offered more refined definitions. See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (1997) (offering an economic perspective,
by which property rights are defined by “the individual’s ability, in expected terms,
to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly
through exchange”) (emphasis in original); WALDRON, supra note 5, at 39 (defining a
private property system as one in which “[t]he owner of a resource is simply the
individual whose determination as to the use of the resource is taken as final”);
Michelman, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that property rights must, at a minimum,
“allow that at least some objects of utility or desire can be fully owned by just one
person,” and that full ownership would ensure “complete and exclusive rights and
privileges over” that object, as well as the power to transfer it to another) (emphasis in
original). However these differ, they still rely heavily on the same notion advocated
by Blackstone. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV.
417, 419 (2000) (noting that suggested definitions by the likes of Michelman and
Waldron do little more than “partake of and help keep current Blackstone’s
endlessly repeated definition”). In the following pages I will show that the actual
protection of the right is very far from the Blackstonian ideal.
9. It should be noted that the erection and enforcement of legal barriers is itself
costly. Therefore, private property regimes never ensure appropriability of all the
benefits that flow from an asset. Consider, for example, the benefits flowing from
the erection of a house which is an architectural masterpiece. While the owner of
the house would derive most of the benefits flowing from it, some residual benefits
may be enjoyed by passers-by, as well as by owners of adjacent properties.
Nevertheless, legal systems would generally not allow the owner to charge passers-by,
nor owners of adjacent properties, on the reasonable assumption that a legal rule
requiring everyone to pay for their relative enjoyment of every architectural piece
would be prohibitively expensive to administer. The legal regime would, however,
allow the property owner to erect a fence around her house, and then charge
passers-by who would like to enter the property to enjoy the sights. Thus, the
expected under-investment in architecture would be limited to the lesser of two
factors: the benefit to passers-by, or the cost of erecting a physical barrier.
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value of the products to be higher than the value of her investment,
she would invest in raising cattle. Thus, once appropriability is
ensured, the farmer would not put her assets to alternative uses
unless she expects these alternative uses to reduce costs or increase
revenues; in the absence of negative externalities, which would
10
generally have to be dealt with by other mechanisms, this would be
the case only if the alternative uses were more efficient. Similarly,
inefficient transfers of resources between owners would be prevented,
because the farmer would not transfer her assets for a price that is
lower than the present value of the expected return on her most
lucrative investment. This price would necessarily be higher than the
price that a less efficient user of the assets would be willing to pay
(again assuming the absence of negative externalities). Property
regimes thus ensure appropriability, thereby allowing the market to
properly incentivize the efficient use of resources.
At this juncture, it should already be noted that the preceding
overview, although very basic, demonstrates both what appropriability
is and what it is not (the importance of the latter will be discussed
more fully below). The appropriability problem revolves around the
ability of investors to reap the rewards of their investment without it
being taken by others who have not invested; it is security against
“poaching” that is central to the problem.
By contrast, the
appropriability problem has very little to do with the type of use that
an owner can make of her assets; appropriability is geared towards
the appropriation of benefits that flow from any use that persons or
entities decide to undertake, regardless of the nature of the use. As a
result, where appropriability is ensured, only one side of the
externalities conundrum is solved:
positive externalities—i.e.,
benefits—are internalized. To the extent that certain inefficient uses
of resources create negative externalities—i.e., costs—that result in
over-usage of resources, these are internalized by other means.
B. Appropriability in Property Analysis
As my reference to Blackstone suggests, the foregoing analysis of
property and appropriability is far from novel. Appropriability was
recognized as a rationale for private property rights and for their
legal protection (through tort and criminal law) for centuries, at least
10. Some negative externalities—most notably, those that have an adverse effect
on neighboring privately held property—are dealt with by tort law doctrines such as
trespass and nuisance. Others—especially those that affect resources that are held in
common—are dealt with through governmental regulation in the form of
environmental laws, zoning laws, etc.
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since the days of Blackstone, Hume, and Bentham. Nevertheless, in
recent years appropriability has attracted relatively little attention in
the analysis of property, for three interrelated reasons.
First, and rather prosaically, is the unremarkable nature of the
appropriability analysis; in a nutshell, it lacks the novelty which
attracts commentators.
A second reason, which I briefly touched upon in the introduction
and which will be dealt with in more depth in the following sections,
is the post-Coasean shift in the focus of economic analysis of property
rights. This shift is best described by Thomas W. Merrill and Henry
E. Smith in a seminal article in which they argue that property law
has shifted its focus from an understanding of property rights as
rights in things that are good against the world at large toward an
understanding of property rights as a bundle of personal, contractlike use rights that are paradigmatically examined in the context of
12
the relations between two parties. This view of property, as Merrill
and Smith note, focuses on the role of property as a baseline for
13
contractual transactions. Under this Coasean view, in the absence of
prohibitive transaction costs, the initial allocation of property rights is
immaterial because it can be easily readjusted by the parties
14
according to market forces.
Alternatively, where significant
transaction costs are present, the initial allocation of property rights
should replicate would-be contractual exchanges in an attempt to
15
minimize the need for costly adjustments. Under either view, the
11. Thus, older accounts of property give a central role to the notion of
appropriability. For example, according to Jeremy Bentham’s account of property as
a basis for expectations:
The idea of property consists in an established expectation; in the
persuasion of being able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing
possessed . . . . It is only through the protection of law that I am able to
inclose a field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure though
distant hope of harvest.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 110–12 (Richard Hildreth trans.,
1908).
12. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 357–58 (“By and large, this view has
become conventional wisdom among legal scholars: Property is a composite of legal
relations that holds between persons and only secondarily or incidentally involves a
‘thing.’”); see also Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J.
1163, 1193–94 (1999) (suggesting that the legal realists’ “bundle of rights” metaphor,
which received such a boost by the Coasean analysis, “is losing its place in property
theory”); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2188 (1997)
(highlighting instances in legal scholarship where contract rights are discussed in
relation to property).
13. Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 359–60 (“Coase implied that property has no
function other than to serve as a baseline for contracting or for collectively imposing
use rights in resources . . . .”).
14. Id. at 368–69.
15. Id. at 369.
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analysis of property rights does not revolve around, and is not driven
by, an imminent threat of misappropriation from the world at large—
the very threat that serves as the foundation of the appropriability
16
problem.
Finally, a third reason for the omission of appropriability from
modern property analysis deals with the paradigmatic subject matter
of property analysis: tangible goods and, most specifically, real
property. Where tangible property is concerned, the appropriability
“problem” is relatively modest, because the famous adage holds true:
possession really is nine-tenths of the law. The legal barriers that
surround tangible goods are typically either a mere reflection of
physical barriers that exist regardless of any legal regime, or are
17
amenable to replication by real world barriers.
These physical
barriers enable anyone with possession of an asset to exercise
considerable control over it, including control over its use and any
benefits that flow from it. Exclusivity of access to physical objects can
be attained by physical force, even where no property regime is in
place; our hypothetical farmer could fight potential cattle poachers
with fences and guards, even if she had no recognized legal right to
the meat and milk that is produced. In the context of tangible
property, the main contribution of private property regimes is thus
not in attaining appropriability, but in reducing the social costs
associated with forceful protection of one’s endeavors, as well as in
the development of the remaining one-tenth of the law—namely the
18
separation of ownership from possession.
By contrast, the role of private property rights in the context of
intangible goods—i.e., information—is much more meaningful.
Intangible goods typically possess all the characteristics of “public
goods”—goods that are not excludable by physical means (at least
not at a reasonable cost) and that are nonrivalrous, i.e., do not

16. Merrill and Smith suggest that the reason for this trend is that the problem of
social order, by and large, had been solved by the time the law and economics
movement emerged, and thus commentators were interested in more novel
problems, such as the maximization of welfare once order had been achieved.
Id. at 398.
17. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 98–100 (explaining the socialization
process through which individuals come to understand basic concepts of property
ownership based on use rights).
18. This may very well be yet another explanation for the trend described by
Merrill and Smith: in the realm of real property, the question of A keeping B out of
Blackacre is simply not very interesting. See supra note 2 and accompanying text
(explaining the shift in the conception of property rights from a view of rights
attached to “things” toward a view of property that is contract-based).
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19

diminish through consumption.
The combination of these two
characteristics creates severe appropriability problems.
Nonexcludability directly hinders appropriability because it
allows—indeed, incentivizes—uncompensated use of the fruits that
are borne from the efforts of those who develop information. Such
uncompensated use is tantamount to “poaching” of the revenues that
20
flow from such efforts. In the context of technological ideas, many
uses (though not all) will disclose the ideas to individuals who have
21
not paid for them. Such disclosure will allow these individuals to
use the ideas for their own benefit, in direct competition with the
originators of the ideas. In the context of expression that is fixed in
tangible form, most distributions of copies will enable distributees to
create further copies, usually at a fraction of the price of developing
22
the underlying expression.
In both cases, copiers will enjoy a
19. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (highlighting the “public good” aspect as a
distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property).
20. It should be noted that the term “poaching” is not as clear in the context of
information as it is with respect to tangible property, because the “fences” around
information are themselves intangible and, in many instances, amorphous.
This problem, however, does not alter the fact that the idea of poaching, and
protection therefrom, is as central to intellectual property law as it is to any other
property regime, if not more so.
21. There are a number of fields where information can be used commercially
without being disclosed or exposed to the public. The quintessential example for
such use is that of the Coca-Cola Company’s secret formula, which has been used for
well over a century in the mass production of the company’s beverages. Clearly,
where information can be used while its secrecy is maintained, its originator does not
face the appropriability problem discussed in this paper, and therefore does not
require—and usually will not seek—statutory intellectual property rights (which
require disclosure and are limited in time). Furthermore, even when the use of
information does expose it to potential free riders, originators would still be able to
appropriate much of the sales of the information due to the competitive advantage
they would enjoy over free riders in terms of lead time to enter the market.
These advantages would be particularly substantial—and, as a result, would ensure
considerable appropriability—in industries characterized by slow learning curves,
strong brand recognition, network effects, or short turnaround time. Unlike the
case of secrecy, originators in these industries may still seek intellectual property-type
protection to supplement their competitive advantage in the market and bolster the
appropriability of their innovation. For data about the preference of specific
industries for one form of protection or another, see generally Richard C. Levin et
al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 18 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987).
22. This problem is most acute—and its analysis most straightforward—in
connection with mass-produced works such as books, movies, recorded music, or
software, where “origin” is of no consequence. By contrast, unique works of visual art
introduce a new wrinkle into the analysis, because copies usually have no effect over
the appropriability of the original works (assuming they are not presented as
originals); they do, however, prevent the originator from appropriating derivative
works. It should be noted further that nonexcludability is not only a legal and
economic problem, but many times may also be a technological problem. Thus, in
some instances, technological “fences” can be erected around intangible assets, and
may be enforced through property regimes. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (prohibiting

1428

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1417

competitive advantage over the originator of the information because
they do not incur the sunk costs associated with developing the
23
information in the first place. Thus, whereas originators have to
charge a price that is higher than their marginal cost of production
(in most cases, substantially higher) in order to recoup their
investment, copiers make an overall profit even when selling at the
marginal cost of production.
Non-rivalry in consumption further exacerbates the appropriability
problem in the context of intangible goods. Non-rivalry enables fast
dispersion of information; even if the initial number of copiers is
minimal, each can use and re-use—i.e., copy and re-copy—the
information perpetually. Information therefore tends to be exposed
and disseminated in ever-increasing circles to an ever-increasing
number of potential free riders, each one joining—rather than
replacing—existing copiers.
Modern-day law and economics scholars are by no means the first
to recognize these typical characteristics of intangible goods, or the
severe appropriability problem that they create. In an oft-quoted
passage, Thomas Jefferson articulated these notions as early as 1813:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself
into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses
24
the less, because every other possesses the whole of it.

It is therefore not surprising that the appropriability problem has
taken a much more central role in the analyses of intellectual
property rights than in the analyses of property rights in general. In
fact, some form of the appropriability problem has been traditionally
recognized as the very cornerstone of intellectual property regimes;
with few exceptions, some guise of the appropriability problem is
considered by commentators and courts alike to be the raison d’être
25
for the creation of such regimes in the first place.
the circumvention of technological measures that control access to copyrighted
works); Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 635, 636–37 (1996) (discussing the concept of zoning in cyberspace).
23. By “copiers” I mean users of information developed by another, regardless of
whether the use concerned implicates actual “copying” of a tangible object.
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333–34 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Ass’n ed.,
1853) (1904).
25. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 247 (1994) (noting that the appropriability problem is “the primary
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Even in the context of intangible goods, however, discussions of
appropriability—the nature of the problem and what it entails—are
both scarce and rudimentary; the problem is acknowledged, but not
much more. In the following section I give a more nuanced account
of the contours of appropriability and the role it plays in property
regimes.
II. THE MEANING AND ROLE OF APPROPRIABILITY
A. Two Kinds of Appropriability
As noted, private property regimes give owners some
26
approximation of a “sole and despotic dominion” over their assets.
The scope of that dominion is determined by the type and extent of
legal protection given by the State to the owners’ property rights.
To understand the role of appropriability in this framework, we must
therefore understand the kind of protection that owners require
specifically to ensure appropriability.
Before we turn to the protection of appropriability, we must begin
by distinguishing two closely related definitions of the concept, only
27
one of which is relevant to the discussion here. This is necessary to
avoid any definitional confusion when talking about appropriability.
problem that the patent system solves”); Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 328
(explaining that in the absence of copyright protection “[t]he market price of the
book will eventually be bid down to the marginal cost of copying, with the
unfortunate result that the book probably will not be produced in the first place”);
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 993 (1997) (“Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to
invent and create. While there are a number of noneconomic theories offered to
explain both copyright and patent law, both the United States Constitution and
judicial decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying
intellectual property.”); id. at 995–96 (“[G]overnment has created intellectual
property rights in an effort to give authors and inventors control over the use and
distribution of their ideas, and therefore encourage them to invest efficiently in the
production of new ideas and works of authorship.”). But see Tom G. Palmer,
Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV.
261, 263 (1989) (advocating for an approach to intellectual property rights founded
upon law and economics theories that are “more mainstream” than the “wealth
maximization” approach adopted by Posner).
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *2.
27. It should be noted that the appropriability problem does not in and of itself
suggest that private property rights are better than competing mechanisms,
operating under competing property regimes, that incentivize efficient exploitation
of resources. In fact, any one of the traditional “holy trinity” of property regimes—
state, common, and private—could provide some sort of mechanism that would
ensure return on certain investments. Whether appropriability—a private property,
market-driven mechanism—is the best possible mechanism is a question which has to
do with our confidence in, and preference for, a free market economy, and not
necessarily with appropriability as such. This feature of appropriability sets it apart
from its counterpart property problem, the tragedy of the commons. Although both
property problems seek to internalize externalities—external benefits in the case of
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In economic parlance, appropriability often refers simply to the
ability of owners to derive revenues—in any way whatsoever—from an
28
In this sense, which I shall refer to as “economic
asset.
appropriability,” appropriability is nothing more than a measure of
how lucrative an asset can be, i.e., a measure of the market value of its
29
fruits.
Economic appropriability is thus a function, first and
30
foremost, of the qualities of the underlying asset.
Economic appropriability should be distinguished from another
notion of appropriability, which I shall refer to as “legal
appropriability.” Legal appropriability is a narrow, nuanced subset of
economic appropriability. Whereas economic appropriability is
focused on the ability of owners to derive revenues from assets in
general, legal appropriability is focused only on the ability to derive
revenues without fearing that such revenues could be taken by others.
This type of appropriability has nothing to do with other issues that
affect the value of an asset.
To make the distinction clearer, assume asset X exists under two
legal regimes, A and B. Under legal regime A, the most lucrative use
of the asset would produce an overall social utility of fifty “units,” and
legal regime A enables an owner to appropriate forty-five such units
for herself (assuming that the other five units are enjoyed by third
parties). Under legal regime B, the most lucrative use of the asset
would produce an overall social utility of one hundred units, ninety
of which could be appropriated by the owner. In this example,
a move from legal regime A to legal regime B would clearly increase
the economic appropriability for the owner of asset X by increasing
her returns. However, her legal appropriability would remain
unchanged (both legal regimes enable the appropriation of ninety
percent of the fruits flowing from asset X).
I mention economic appropriability here mainly as a caveat.
Economic appropriability has very little to do with the appropriability
problem discussed earlier. Moreover, it is not, and cannot be,

appropriability problems, external costs in the case of tragedies of the commons—
tragedies of the commons generate a specific argument against common ownership
(and, to an extent, state ownership) and in favor of private property.
28. See BARZEL, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasizing the value of exchange in defining
economic property rights).
29. Much of the economics-oriented literature about intellectual property refers
to appropriability in this sense—as a measure of the incentives to create or invent
intangible property. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005) (noting that “[f]or the appropriability story
to hold, patents must be shown to be an effective means of capturing value.”).
30. However, economic appropriability may also be affected by regulatory
schemes relating to uses of the asset, such as zoning regulations.
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a meaningful concept in determining the scope of protections
afforded by property rights. Economic appropriability is a completely
open-ended concept; all it does is measure value. If we were to use
economic appropriability to guide us in shaping the rights of
property owners, the only principle that could guide us would be
“more is better”; arguably, the more protection an owner enjoys, the
higher her returns. A legal regime, however, clearly cannot—and
should not—assure absolute protection (or any approximation
thereof) to every owner at any point in time; not only would such a
regime be prohibitively costly, but it would also break down where
uses are incompatible.
Moreover, maximization of benefits to owners is only loosely tied to
maximization of overall value. If property owners were shielded from
certain costs associated with the use of their assets (as they would be if
such use was protected as an exercise of their property right),
inefficient uses would often be protected and rewarded at the
expense of society as a whole.
Legal appropriability, by contrast, lies at the very heart of property
31
regimes. Legal appropriability is related to the protection that a
legal system affords owners in the face of the appropriability problem
I presented in the previous pages, a problem that revolves around the
fact that “[m]en universally desire to enjoy speedily—to enjoy without
32
labour,” and the problem’s resulting danger (of under-usage of
resources). The appropriability problem has nothing to do with
questions of maximization of revenues to owners; rather, it is
concerned only with the ability of owners to appropriate those
revenues that actually flow from their assets and are the result of
allowed uses thereof. In this respect, legal appropriability bears a
clear relation to such Benthamian notions as security and
33
expectation. As Bentham explained, when speaking of security as
the principal object of legal regimes:
Law does not say to man, Labour, and I will reward you; but it says:
Labour, and I will assure to you the enjoyment of the fruits of your labour—
that natural and sufficient recompense which without me you cannot

31. I do not suggest that this notion is “legal” in the sense that it is a cognizable
legal right, or that there is anything inherently “legalistic” about it. I suggest only
that it is the form of appropriability that legal systems should—and do—seek to
attain.
32. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 114.
33. See id. at 109 (“We come now to the principal object of law,—the care of
security.”); id. at 111 (“Property is nothing but a basis of expectation . . . .”).

1432

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1417

preserve; I will insure it by arresting the hand which may seek to ravish it
34
from you.

Similarly, legal appropriability is satisfied when “the hand which
may seek to ravish” is arrested and “poaching” is prevented; that, and
nothing more.
B. Appropriability as a Boundary Rule
The traditional legal solution to the appropriability problem is to
grant to individuals the right to exclude others from certain assets
(manifested through tort actions and the like), declaring those
individuals as the assets’ “owners.” Exclusionary rights promote
exclusive use of assets and prevent tragedies of the commons.
Such rights also ensure that those exploiting the assets are free from
the threat of poachers, thereby enabling transactions with others for
access to the fruits of their labor. Thus, it is not surprising that
Blackstone, Bentham, and many subsequent commentators have
identified the right to exclude as the central right at the core of
35
property regimes.
These commentaries, however, typically suffer
from two notable failures.
First, many commentators have failed to note that exclusionary
36
rights only serve as a crude proxy, a means to an end. Describing
ownership simply as a “right to exclude” gives us a poor account of
the actual scope of owners’ rights, the rationales that should guide
courts in determining that scope, and the goals that these rights—
and incidents thereof—are intended to achieve. These questions
must be addressed in terms of the underlying problems that property
regimes seek to solve, not in terms of the exclusionary rights
themselves. The problem of tragedies of the commons, one of the
two underlying problems that exclusive rights are intended to solve,
provides very limited guidance on these issues: it clearly requires
exclusivity of use—i.e., privatization of resources—but does not call
for any specific allocation of exclusive use rights. It is therefore legal
appropriability that must define the scope of property rights; legal
appropriability requires that these rights address the appropriability
problem as it arises in connection with specific types of assets.
Property rights, therefore, are not simply exclusionary rights as such;
they are best understood as a set of exclusionary rights that apply to
34. Id. at 110.
35. For an excellent modern overview of this approach, and the opposition
thereto, see Merrill, supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 730 (“[T]he right to exclude others is more
than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”).
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assets, the exclusive exploitation of which (in certain ways) is deemed
by the legal system to be worthy of protection from interference by
third parties.
Second, due to their focus on exclusionary rights, former
commentaries have failed to recognize the problems of the tragedy of
the commons and appropriability as the only systemic problems
underlying private property regimes—i.e., the only problems that
37
every private property regime must address. To fully appreciate this
idea, we must bear in mind our initial understanding of the role of
the property regime as a legal doctrine that governs the allocation of
scarce resources, and which is intended to ensure (or at least
incentivize) efficient exploitation thereof.
Tragedies of the commons suggest that this allocation is most
efficient when it is done through the parceling of resources which are
then assigned to private individuals, each with an exclusive right to
38
use the resources in certain ways. The appropriability problem adds
another layer to this notion by requiring that the return on exclusive
uses be secured against poaching so that investments and rewards are
aligned. No other set of economic problems in and of itself requires
parceling of resources or assignment thereof in such a way—i.e., the
assignment of exclusive use rights and the creation of exclusionary
rights that are good against the world. More importantly, no other
set of economic problems is so pervasive: only these problems apply to
virtually every type of resource and underlie the exploitation of
practically any type of asset, whether immovable or movable, tangible
or intangible.
The extent of these problems may differ from case to case, and the
rights of owners may be tailored idiosyncratically to address these
differences, but the general contours of the underlying problems
remain constant. Thus, as a baseline rule, property rights must
ensure exclusive use (to prevent tragedies of the commons) and
freedom from poaching of the fruits of such use (to prevent an
appropriability problem). Absent some other pervasive problem
underlying every allocation of resources, property rights do not need
37. Even when former analyses did focus on attempts to delineate the boundaries
of property, they typically revolved around an actual legal manifestation—such as the
right to exclude—and not on the underlying rationales for exclusion, such as the
need for appropriability. See, e.g., id. at 754 (arguing that property “means the right
to exclude others from valued resources, no more and no less”).
38. This holds true as long as the parcels are not so small as to give rise to the
problem of “anticommons”—the need for excessive (and costly) cooperation
between owners before any parcel can be used. See Heller, supra note 5, at 665 n.201
(“[E]xcess partition . . . of land can create an anticommons as parcels become
uneconomically small after successive partitions.”).
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to ensure anything else. Legal appropriability, therefore, should
generally serve as the boundary that delimits the scope of property
rights; as a general rule, owners of exclusive use rights should be
protected only against poaching.
This proposition, it must be stressed, concerns only a baseline rule
of property.
Deviations from that baseline are common.
Exclusionary rights are a somewhat crude proxy for attaining
appropriability, and their administration comes at a cost. Therefore,
property rights never ensure perfect appropriability, nor do they
ensure only appropriability; they are over-inclusive in some respects,
and under-inclusive in others. Moreover, once property regimes have
been set up as legal institutions with unique features, these features
may sometimes be used to solve idiosyncratic problems. Thus, a
given legal system may tweak the scope of property rights, extending
or curtailing the rights of some or all owners to a level above or below
the call of the problems underlying the baseline rule. These
streamlining efforts would usually be tied to idiosyncratic situations
where the type of resources involved, or some characteristic of the
market, requires unique adaptation; they do not, however, affect the
baseline notion of property.
Consider, for example, “open range” laws enacted in a number of
39
states, which require farmers to “fence out” cattle. Such laws tweak
the traditional rule of trespass by demanding that farmers erect
fences that meet certain minimum standards before they can hold
ranchers liable for damages to their crops caused by cattle physically
40
invading the farmers’ land.
These laws address a specific,
idiosyncratic problem that arises in areas populated by many ranchers
(and cattle heads) whose land is devoted to grazing rather than
farming. In such areas, it is arguably more efficient for the few
farmers to fence their fields than for the cattle to be constantly
guarded or “fenced in.” These laws therefore attempt to streamline
property rules by requiring farmers to shoulder the burden of
erecting physical barriers as a precondition to the erection of legal

39. A typical “open range” law states: “An owner or occupant of land is not
entitled to recover for damage resulting from the trespass of animals unless the land
is enclosed within a lawful fence . . . .” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-1427 (2009).
40. One might argue that the traditional rule of trespass assures more than mere
appropriability because it gives farmers a right against poachers and non-poachers
alike. Some further discussion of this rule will be undertaken in the following
sections. For present purposes, we may nevertheless note that to the extent trespass
rules exceed the call of appropriability, such extension is aimed at assuring
exclusivity of use of the farmers’ land—i.e., at avoiding tragedies of the commons.
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fences that would protect them against one particular poaching-like
threat—namely, cattle.
This streamlining effort affects the allocation of respective use
rights; in an open range territory, a rancher can be said to have a
right to “use” the farmer’s land in certain circumstances. However,
the adjusted rules do not undermine legal appropriability as such,
41
since they do not allow poaching of any kind. Ultimately, “open
range” laws do not create a unique property paradigm; at most, they
offer a nuance to an existing paradigm. The baseline rule remains
largely unchanged; use rights are still generally exclusive (even if
their allocation is somewhat nontraditional), and owners have a legal
right to appropriate the fruits of their exploitation.
C. Interim Conclusion
Appropriability is a defining concept of private property regimes.
It is not just one of many problems underlying private property;
rather, it is the systemic problem that underlies property regimes,
defines them, and should serve as the measuring stick by which they
should be assessed.
In the pages above, I offered an overview of the contours of legal
appropriability in the abstract. Against this backdrop, I shall now
turn to examine more practical aspects of legal appropriability,
namely the application of legal appropriability as evidenced in
familiar property doctrine. In particular, I shall focus on three
dimensions of property law in which legal appropriability comes into
play. In Part III, I examine how legal appropriability, when analyzed
in a multilateral context (i.e., where parties are numerous), gives
substance to a “baseline” allocation of exclusionary rights that ties
into the notion of the “thingness” of property—a notion prevalent in
traditional property analysis but largely missing from the current
“bundle of rights” analysis.
In Part IV, I turn to examine the role of appropriability in the law
of servitudes. In that context, I argue that servitudes are best
understood as an extension of property law beyond the core dictated
by the call of legal appropriability. As such, servitudes are justifiable
only in certain limited contexts, as an extension of property law into
the realms of contract law in situations where the latter is susceptible
to a systemic breakdown. As an example, I show why servitudes would
41. “Open range” rules assume accidental invasion of farmed land. The rules do
not allow ranchers to deliberately lead their cattle onto the farmed land; they
certainly do not allow a rancher to harvest another’s farmland and feed the crops to
her cattle, regardless of whether the farmland was fenced.
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generally be justified in the context of real property, but not in the
context of chattels and intellectual property-based goods.
Finally, in Part V, I examine the role of appropriability in the
constitutional context of takings law—the law concerning
governmental taking of private property for public use under the
42
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In this context, I review
the prevailing takings jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, examine
the analyses of several notable academics, and demonstrate how the
Supreme Court’s notion of “property,” for purposes of its takings
jurisprudence, is best understood as an application of legal
appropriability.
III. APPROPRIABILITY, NUMEROSITY, AND THE SPATIAL DIMENSION OF
PROPERTY
A. The Coasean Shift in Property
The operation of the appropriability analysis in property law is
perhaps best seen in an area of property law that was severely
undermined by the Coasean analysis, namely the “default” or
“baseline” spatial allocation of property rights. The “open range”
example discussed in the previous section, which is essentially
identical to Coase’s paradigmatic rancher-farmer example, ties us
back to Coase and the “bundle of rights” metaphor. In light of the
foregoing appropriability analysis, a reassessment of that Coasean
view and its effects on property theory is therefore appropriate.
43
In the first part of his classic article, The Problem of Social Cost,
Coase uses the bilateral rancher-farmer example to suggest that in
the absence of transaction costs (and, more precisely, in the absence
of prohibitive transaction costs), the initial allocation of property
rights is immaterial because parties would transact to achieve the
44
most efficient uses of resources regardless of that allocation. All that
matters, according to Coase, is that the initial allocation be “well45
defined,” so that it can serve as a baseline for contracting.
By contrast, where transaction costs are significant and might prevent
certain efficient realignment of rights, the default rules should

42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (forbidding the taking of “private property . . .
without just compensation”).
43. Coase, supra note 2.
44. See id. at 2–6.
45. See id. at 19 (“[I]f market transactions were costless, all that matters
(questions of equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be welldefined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.”).
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attempt to replicate the results of would-be transactions. In either
case, the allocation of property rights under the Coasean view is
either completely or partially malleable, and almost invariably should
be done on a rather ad hoc basis, as between given competing uses
(subject only to the need to maintain some certainty of judicial
outcomes); ultimately, the substance and initial allocation of property
rights is immaterial, so long as parties are allowed to transact.
As a result, the Coasean allocation of rights does not necessarily
have anything to do with the physical properties of any object to
which property rights traditionally attach. Indeed, Coase’s point
about the “reciprocity” of the problem of competing uses flatly
contradicts the proposition that the farmer has any priority in her
47
right to use “her” land vis-à-vis the right of the rancher. The use
rights of each are either immaterial (in the absence of transaction
costs) or, more likely, should aim to replicate whatever use of the
farmer’s land the farmer and the rancher would have transacted for
48
but for the inevitable existence of transaction costs.
Thus, the
Coasean approach shifts property analysis away from its traditional
focus on “things”; if property is comprised of a bundle of use rights,
then it is these use rights—and not the underlying “things” or
assets—that must be parceled and allocated to individuals.
Accordingly, when Coase turns to examine the rancher-farmer
situation, the question he really examines does not concern rights to
the land as such, but rather whether the owner or a neighboring
rancher has (or should have) the rights to use a piece of farmland for
49
storage of a certain number of runaway cattle heads. In this sense,
Coase offers a real paradigm shift from the traditional notion of “sole
46. See, e.g., id. (“It would therefore seem desirable that the courts should
understand the economic consequences of their decisions and should, insofar as this
is possible without creating too much uncertainty about the legal position itself, take
these consequences into account when making their decisions.”). Although Coase
discusses rules of decision in this excerpt, default rules should give clear guidance as
to judicial outcomes if “certainty” is to be attained.
47. See id. at 2 (discussing the “reciprocal” nature of the problem of competing
uses).
48. See, e.g., id. at 5–6 (demonstrating the transaction by which the farmer and
rancher determine how to allocate use of the farmland).
49. See id. at 2 (“The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed
to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?”); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 34 (1959) (“[W]hether we have the
right to shoot over another man’s land has been thought of as depending on who
owns the airspace over the land. It would be simpler to discuss what we should be
allowed to do with a gun.”). Coase’s position is that where transaction costs are low,
the question of ownership of the land is immaterial because the farmer and the
rancher would transact for an optimal allocation, with the rancher buying some
trampling rights from the farmer (for actual use), or selling some of them to the
farmer (for non-use), as the case may be.
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50

and despotic dominion,” as well as from well-established property
51
doctrines such as ad coelum.
The Coasean analysis is incomplete, I believe, in two respects.
First, Coase’s analysis is focused on bilateral instances of competing
uses and, as such, does not expressly account for the fact that
appropriability is a prerequisite of any “well-defined” property rights,
at least once we understand the multilateral nature of the problem.
Presumably, Coase assumed that any right to use includes a
corresponding right to appropriate the returns from an allowed use;
the bilateral focus of his analysis has allowed others, however, to use a
Coasean-like analysis to suggest that use rights and appropriation
52
rights may diverge. Second, and more importantly, because Coase
does not directly address the issues of appropriability and numerosity,
his account of the “thingness” of property is deficient. Both of these
shortcomings will be taken up in the following sections.
B. Appropriability and Numerosity
As noted above, Coase suggests that absent transaction costs, the
initial allocation of property rights is immaterial, because parties
53
would freely transact to an optimally efficient allocation. To the
extent that proposition pertains only to the allocation of exclusive
use-rights (which stand at the heart of the Coasean analysis), I have
no fundamental quarrel with it. However, I believe the proposition
to be incomplete, as exclusive use rights solve the tragedy of the
54
commons problem but not the appropriability problem.
Indeed, Coase is careful in framing his examples, limiting them to
instances of competition between two generally efficient uses that are

50. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *2.
51. See, e.g., Eric Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics,
and Natural Property Rights (George Mason Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 08-20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117999 (arguing that a
Coasean approach to land-use torts departs from well established boundary rules,
such as ad coelum, thereby making tort doctrine less determinate and more costly to
administer); Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 389, 394–95 (noting that there is an
information-cost advantage to retaining boundary rules such as ad coelum, despite the
Coasean critique of such rules).
52. Duncan Kennedy and Frank I. Michelman have taken up the issue of theft;
specifically, they argue that absent transaction costs, “there will be no theft.” Duncan
Kennedy & Frank I. Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
711, 720–22 (1980). For my discussion of why I believe this argument to be
fundamentally flawed, see infra Part III.B.
53. Coase, supra note 2, at 19 (“[I]f market transactions were costless, all that
matters (questions of equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties should be
well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.”).
54. See id. at 1 (“This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms
which have harmful effects on others.”).
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conflicting yet mutually independent. For instance, Coase focuses
his analysis on the damage caused by cattle trampling the crops on a
56
By contrast, his analysis makes no room for the
farmer’s land.
possibility that a rancher’s cattle graze a farmer’s land, i.e., that a
rancher derives a benefit from a farmer’s crops—a benefit that
57
essentially requires continued cultivation of the farmer’s land.
Similarly, Coase recognizes the possibility that the rancher may have a
right to trample the crop (which may or may not trump the farmer’s
58
own use rights in her land). By contrast, Coase does not recognize
the viability of a property regime wherein the rancher has a right to
use the farmer’s crops for grazing, or a right to harvest those crops and
59
feed them to her cattle. Thus, Coase’s examples clearly deal with
only negative externalities; they do not address positive externalities,
which are the only externalities that legal appropriability addresses.
Moreover, Coase’s examples do not suggest a separation between
the right to use and the right to appropriate. In all the examples, the
owner of a use right invariably also has the corresponding right to
appropriate the returns flowing from that use, with the farmer
appropriating the returns from farming (if there are any returns left)
60
and the rancher appropriating the returns from cattle-raising.
To the extent that uses are incompatible, as is the case with farming
and ranching, it is the right of use that is curtailed by competing use
61
rights, not the right to appropriate the returns from such use.
Nonetheless, because Coase does not explicitly deal with the issue
of appropriability, and because his examples are given in the bilateral

55. See id. at 2 (observing the conflicting interests of a confectioner’s noisy
machinery and a doctor’s disturbed practice; a rancher’s straying cattle and a
farmer’s destroyed crops; and a business’s emission of contaminants and a stream’s
polluted fish supply).
56. See id. at 2–4 (utilizing the straying cattle example in evaluating the pricing
system and liability for damages).
57. See id. at 4 (assuming that the parties would bargain for non-cultivation of the
farmland in order to minimize the damages caused by the invading cattle;
the possibility that leaving the land barren would also decrease the rancher’s profits
is never discussed).
58. See id. at 2 (arguing that competing interests in use rights should be resolved
not simply by restraining the non-owner, but by determining which harm inflicted is
greater and then by avoiding that harm).
59. See supra text accompanying note 55.
60. See id.
61. Note that this echoes the distinction between economic and legal
appropriability. If a rancher has the right to raise cattle and trample a farmer’s crop,
this would arguably diminish the farmer’s economic appropriability, i.e., reduce the
farmer’s revenue stream. However, as long as the farmer has an exclusive right to
appropriate the returns from the crop that is left intact (as well as the right to
prevent trampling by erecting a fence, for instance), her legal appropriability
remains unaffected.
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context, Coase fails to outright reject the proposition that a wedge
can be driven between the right to use and the right to appropriate.
Hence, he also rejects the proposition that a private property regime
may viably exist where, as a default rule, investment and rewards are
completely separated and therefore require parties to transact for the
purpose of realigning them. Thus, Duncan Kennedy and Frank
Michelman, in a seminal article targeting the incentivizing effects of
private property, rely on a Coasean-like analysis to assert that even
theft is not necessarily inefficient, because:
If there are no transaction costs, there will be no theft, even
without the coercive legal institution of property [i.e., without any
assurance of appropriability], unless the property is worth more to
the thief than to the victim [in which case the theft would arguably
be efficient]. Otherwise, the possessor will offer the thief some
62
sum to go away, they will negotiate, and strike a bargain . . . .

This argument is an extreme yet illustrative example of the
misguided use that can be made of the Coasean analysis due to its
bilateral framing.
In a poaching-type situation, however, the
63
competition is not between different uses, as in Coase’s examples,
but rather between different users, with each user seeking to make the
very same use of the underlying resource. In this type of situation, as
Kennedy and Michelman suggest, the initial allocation of property
rights may be immaterial as between parties that are proximate
enough to transact, such as is typically the case in Coase’s (and
64
Kennedy’s and Michelman’s) two-party examples. For example, a
farmer could easily live with a rule that allows her neighbor’s cattle to
graze her land. After all, it is easy enough to imagine a situation
where the farmer would contract with a rancher, or even with several
ranchers, for this type of arrangement, charging the rancher(s) a per
capita fee. By contrast, it is not trivial to assume that farmers—as a
class—could adjust to a rule that allows ranchers—as a class—
to intentionally allow cattle to graze the farmers’ lands. What is
immaterial in the two-party situation gains a whole new meaning
vis-à-vis the world at large; the sheer numerosity of putative poachers

62. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 52, at 720.
63. See Coase, supra note 2, at 2 (differentiating between uses of various
hypothetical users).
64. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 52, at 720–22 (purporting that
negotiation between an owner and a non-owner will occur to prevent theft,
regardless of original property rights, if such a transaction will promote efficiency
and cut down on transaction costs); see also Coase, supra note 2, at 2 (providing
examples of two-party conflicts that create incentives to bargain for use rights).
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makes a great deal of difference in the analysis, even in the absence
of transaction costs.
Consider, for present purposes, the following two problems posed
by the numerosity factor. First, in order to achieve an optimal
allocation between multiple individuals, a situation with numerous
participants would require not only frictionless transacting, but also
perfect information and frictionless coordination between all putative
poachers. Without meeting these requirements, each poacher would
not be able to place a correct value on the crop, because she would
not be able to evaluate her competition, and, as a result, her chances
of actually seizing the crop (or parts thereof). Assume, for example,
that a farmer values the crop at ten units, and three potential
poachers each value it at nine units. Unless each poacher knows that
the two other poachers are competing, one poacher would not be
able to place a true value on her utility function of poaching the
crop—say, for instance, a utility of three units (assuming that each
poacher has an equal probability of one-third that he or she will
poach the entire crop). Absent such information, the transaction
between the thief and the farmer would readily break down, even if
this bilateral transaction were in and of itself costless to execute.
This problem is further exacerbated when a temporal aspect enters
the negotiations. In a nutshell, deals between the farmer and
potential thieves cannot be struck over time, even absent transaction
costs, because each poacher would reevaluate her position following
each deal struck between the farmer and another poacher. Ex post,
the farmer would have no hope of settling with the entire class of
poachers at a profitable price, but would instead have to recur ever65
increasing sunk costs (in the form of past settlements). Ex ante,
a farmer would not undertake to grow the crop absent any hope of
66
reaching effective settlement with the putative class of poachers.
65. In a market with perfect information, the first poacher would be willing to
settle for any price above three units. However, once the farmer settled with the first
poacher, the remaining two poachers would re-evaluate their positions, and would
each place a utility of 4.5 (a probability of 1/2 of attaining 9 units worth of crops) on
their poaching efforts, due to the decreased competition resulting from the first
poacher’s settlement. If one more poacher would settle, the remaining poacher
would not settle for anything below nine units. All in all, a farmer settling with the
poachers over time would have to pay them over 16.5 units to prevent poaching
altogether—well above the utility value of the crop to either the farmer or the
poachers.
66. These problems would usually not arise in connection with competing uses
because the effects of competing uses are generally cumulative. Thus, a farmer’s
potential damages would be D1, D2 . . . Dn, with each amount of damage
corresponding to the total number of cattle heads raised by the farmer’s neighbors.
Invariably, the identity of the owner of the Xn cattle head is immaterial under these
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If these problems sound familiar, this should not come as a
surprise.
With the removal of protection against poaching,
a problem which is not dissimilar to the familiar tragedy of the
commons arises, only this time the tragedy occurs at the level of the
right to appropriate returns, rather than the right to use the
underlying resources. The crux of the problem remains the same:
the grant of the right to a single stream of revenue (the farmer’s
crops) to a class of numerous individuals.
The second problem caused by the numerosity factor deals with
the fact that in a nearly infinite class of putative poachers all
competing for appropriation of the very same commodity, we witness
the breakdown of another implied Coasean assumption that
Michelman and Kennedy rely upon: different people place different
67
values on competing uses. Indeed, in the Coasean two-party model,
we could safely assume that the two parties would place different
values on each use, thus enabling the transfer of the right to the
68
highest bidder. However, as the number of parties increases, with
each party vying for the same exact use, we would arguably have more
parties with very similar preferences. Ultimately, if we were to assume
an infinite number of putative poachers, we would also have to assume
that some members of the class would have preferences that are
indistinguishable from those of the owner, i.e., that those members
69
would place the same value on crops as the farmer. As between the
farmer and these putative poachers, the negotiating mechanism
breaks down. Neither will settle for anything less than the entire
value of the crop, even if the negotiation itself was not costly. In a
world where the right to use and the right to appropriate are aligned,
this would not pose a problem: the equilibrium would be the status
quo, e.g., the farmer would retain both the right to sow and the right
to reap. However, where these rights are separated, the ex ante
realization that a settlement that leaves any value in the hands of the
farmer is most likely impossible would prevent the farmer from
circumstances. Of course, numerosity of ranchers and/or farmers would probably
create problems where transaction costs are consequential.
67. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 52, at 720–21 (presuming that each
victim and thief will be willing to exchange different monetary values for the object
in question, depending on their desired uses of the object).
68. This is a fundamentally sound assumption in typical situations, where
competing uses are not mutually exclusive. For example, one cow would probably
not destroy a whole field (and would be unlikely to escape in the first place).
The rancher and farmer would thus not negotiate for ranching or farming, but
rather for a mutually beneficial (and overall efficient) level of both uses.
69. Indeed, where numerous participants are involved, we can assume that a
market would develop; in that case, we can assume that every putative poacher would
place the market value on the crop, as would the farmer.
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taking on the entire endeavor. Indeed, an appropriability problem
70
would arise.
C. Appropriability and “Thingness”
The shift away from a bilateral analysis of property rights to an
analysis predicated on the relationships between numerous parties
has implications that go far beyond disproving Kennedy’s and
Michelman’s nihilistic proposition about theft. In fact, it goes a long
way in disproving the more modest nihilistic notions that have
plagued the property field in the wake of the Coase theorem, namely
the idea that property is just a label one can place on any given set of
use rights. The analysis above should make clear that Coase’s
requirement of “well-defined” property rights is not as empty a shell
71
as one would initially think. In fact, the numerosity-based analysis
demonstrates that protection against poaching and free riding—
protection of legal appropriability against the world at large—is a
prerequisite to any well-defined property regime. Coase’s analysis—
like any property analysis—cannot stand absent such baseline notions
about the substance of property rights.
This understanding of the baseline of property rights gives much
credence to the notion of “thingness” of property rights, a notion
72
that was severely undermined by the Coasean analysis. As noted
above, the Coasean analysis breaks away from traditional property
notions that underlie this feature of property, such as the ad coelum
principle, or trespass rules that revolve around physical invasion.
This is because the Coasean analysis suggests that there is no a priori
reason to assume that an owner of a thing should have priority in
73
using that thing for a particular purpose. In a Coasean world, the
focus of property analysis is shifted from the exclusionary rights of
owners with respect to things that are owned—say, a farmer’s right to
70. Nor would the farmer be able to sell the right to farm, because any buyer
would be faced with the same problem. The only buyer who would be willing to
invest in the land under these conditions would be one who would be able to fend
off poachers regardless of the legal regime.
71. Compare Coase, supra note 49, at 14 (acknowledging that any property regime
would require exclusive rights in resources in order to prevent a state of chaos that
would undermine the operation of the market through contracting), with Merrill &
Smith, supra note 2, at 373 n.68 (commenting that “the only virtue of property Coase
mentions [when referring to the state of property-less chaos] is that it facilitates the
ability to enter into contracts”). Coase’s point has not been extended, however, to
address the appropriability problem.
72. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 373 (highlighting Coase’s focus on
property rights as necessary to create contracts so that goods can be bought and sold,
rather than the importance of the right to exclude others).
73. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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exclude others from her land—to the respective use rights of owners
74
whose uses may affect one another—say, farmers and ranchers.
Thus, in a Coasean world, legal systems should not be concerned
with, or guided by, rules that prevent invasion of another’s property.
Instead, they should be concerned with and guided by rules that
define discrete (and necessarily malleable) use rights, such as the
75
right to raise cattle.
This shift, demonstrated so elegantly by Coase, becomes
dramatically less compelling once we realize that any allocation of use
rights must be made against the backdrop of a property regime that
must protect appropriability, at least to some reasonable degree.
In any property regime, owners must enjoy a set of legal rights that
would ensure reasonable protection of their investments against an
indefinite class of putative poachers. In other words, regardless of
any allocation of use rights, owners must have a right to exclude
putative poachers from the fruits of their labor.
But how can this exclusionary right be translated into a legal norm?
Such a norm would have to send a clear exclusionary message to an
76
undefined class.
To achieve that goal, it must (1) draw a clear
boundary around the object to be protected for appropriation; and
(2) signal this boundary to the world at large. In a perfect world,
such a boundary could perhaps be drawn around all the fruits of
allowed uses, i.e., those uses to which the owner has a legal right.
In the real world, however, owners usually can use their assets in
77
numerous ways that neither the legal system nor third parties can
predict with any certainty. Therefore, drawing a clear boundary
around the fruits of specific uses would be impossible. A much more

74. See supra notes 55 and 58 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
76. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (presenting a theory
on information costs as the basis for the relative homogeneity within property
regimes); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 471–74 (2004) (viewing information costs as the basis for retaining the
“thingness” of property in the intellectual property field); Merrill & Smith, supra note
2, at 385–88 (reasoning that government standardization of property rights is
necessary to reduce data-gathering and administrative costs;
Molly S. Van
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 910–14 (2008) (recognizing
servitude concerns related to notice and information costs in the intellectual
property field).
77. To use the “bundle of rights” metaphor, owners usually hold the biggest
bundle with respect to the assets they own. This is true even under the Coasean
analysis, because the owner usually has all residual use rights, whereas non-owners
only have, at best, one or two specific rights to use another’s property as a result of
spillovers.
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viable solution, at least in the case of physical assets, would be to
draw a boundary around each owner’s actual asset, regardless of the
owner’s use thereof. Such boundary would be relatively easy to
administer and, absent special circumstances, should not be
79
excessively under-inclusive. A right to exclude putative poachers
that is generally coterminous with the boundaries of the underlying
asset—i.e., the thing that is owned—would thus best protect
appropriability.
This analysis offers a much better understanding of the
relationship between the bundle of rights metaphor (in the sense
referred to herein) and the notion of “thingness” so prevalent in
80
more traditional analyses of property rights. It makes plain that
“thingness” is not an arbitrary aspect of property regimes. At least
when it comes to protection against poaching, it is a requisite feature
thereof. Moreover, whatever may be the “reciprocal” nature of the
problem of competing use, it must be analyzed against the backdrop
of an appropriability problem that is both systemic and entirely unidirectional (i.e., a problem pertaining to an outside threat to
owners), and must be solved against a set of rules that must also
address that appropriability problem effectively.
Notably, this conclusion is not contrary to the Coasean analysis.
It merely suggests that when the Coasean analysis is applied correctly,
it must account for the numerosity factor and for the need to ensure
appropriability. In these situations, this conclusion would generally
require a default allocation that would include a right to exclude

78. Cf. Long, supra note 76, at 473 (arguing that the problem of defining
alternative boundaries, combined with the information costs associated with
intangible ideas, have required intellectual property regimes to adhere more strictly
than tangible property regimes to a clear definition of the thing that is protected:
well-specified “claims” in the case of patents, or a specific expression made in
tangible form in the case of copyrights).
79. Situations in which a large proportion of the benefits from a specific use spill
over into the property of another are generally rare.
80. Many post-realist scholars have argued that the traditional notion of
“thingness” is merely a naïve, layperson’s account. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 17,
at 26–31, 97–103 (claiming that the pervasive legal view of property is of the
relationships arising among people with respect to things, rather than the
relationship between a person and his things); Grey, supra note 3, at 69 (contrasting
a layperson’s view of property as things owned by people with a specialist’s
understanding of property as a bundle of rights). Others have countered by arguing
that any account of property that overlooks its “thingness” is incomplete. See Merrill
& Smith, supra note 2, at 397–98 (suggesting that by completely ignoring an in rem
dimension of property, modern commentators in the field of law and economics
have a distorted and incomplete understanding of property rights); see also Long,
supra note 76, at 473 (suggesting that “[a] question is beginning to emerge . . . in the
literature: Why do these two conceptions of property proper—those of the layperson
and the specialist—continue to coexist?”).
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poachers from the entire thing that is owned as the best
approximation of what transacting parties would agree to in a
frictionless world. Whether the right to exclude poachers should be
extended also to non-poachers in every single case, as trespass law
suggests, is a separate question which goes well beyond the scope of
81
this paper. Intuitively, however, the appeal of such an extension is
clear, at least in terms of simplifying the administration of the antipoaching rule; the invasion test affords an easy resolution of a huge
bulk of cases. By contrast, the “classic” ad hoc Coasean analysis
should apply with full force to noninvasive competing uses
82
traditionally handled under the doctrinal heading of nuisance law.
As Coase suggested, these disputes should be resolved clearly in order

81. One way of looking at this question would be through the Coasean analysis.
Under that analysis, we may assume that owners must have a right to exclude one
undefined class: poachers. By contrast, it is usually unimportant whether owners
have a right to exclude a second undefined class: competing uses. Nor is it
important whether the use rights of that class trump those of the owner. Under
these circumstances, it would generally be much easier to concentrate all
exclusionary powers in the hand of one agent—the owner—instead of dispersing
them, since this would create a clear boundary rule and dramatically reduce
information costs.
Another way of looking at this question would be to assess the effectiveness of a
right to exclude that is good only against poachers. It should be noted that such a
right could create considerable problems for owners. Most notably, in many cases,
owners would not be able to distinguish poachers from non-poachers. Take, for
example, the rancher-farmer situation. When a farmer is faced with cattle on her
land (or cattle threatening to invade her land), she has no way of knowing whether
the cattle got there by accident (competing use) or intentionally (poaching).
In most cases, a judicial determination of this question would be ineffective (in terms
of protecting the farmer’s ex ante incentives), because it would have to be made
ex post. Such a determination would involve an inquiry into the intent of the rancher
that would likely be prolonged, costly, and uncertain in its results, like any inquiry
into subjective issues (even if some objective indications thereto may be used to
facilitate it). With every additional competing use that would be allowed to invade
the farmer’s land, the problem of distinguishing poachers from non-poachers would
be exacerbated. With each such use, the farmer’s ability to exclude poachers would
be undermined, and her incentive to (efficiently) invest in her tract of land would
diminish. Ultimately, if too many invasive competing uses are allowed on the
farmer’s land, the farmer would find herself forced to choose between
over-enforcement (which would lead to constant bickering and subsequent liability)
and relinquishment of all ex ante enforcement efforts in favor of costly, ineffective,
ex post protection. The law of trespass, essentially forbidding all physical invasions, as
well as the ad coelum principle that underlies it, may be justified, at least in part, by
this very problem.
82. As the previous footnote suggests, they would also apply to situations where a
right to invade is exceedingly efficient and transaction costs are high. Such instances
are somewhat rare, but they do exist, especially when invasions are not intrusive, such
as in the case of air travel, broadcasting, etc. These instances require a streamlining
of property rights. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2) (2000) (granting all citizens a
common “right of transit through the navigable airspace” of the United States).
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to facilitate contracting for efficient allocation. Where transaction
costs are minimal, these cases could essentially be resolved arbitrarily,
so long as the arbitrary rule is clear. Where transaction costs are
significant, resolution would have to be based on an ad hoc, cost-benefit analysis of the uses involved, in an attempt to replicate the
ultimate allocation that would have been reached absent transaction
costs. In either case, the allocation of competing use rights operates
against the backdrop of a “baseline” in the form of a necessary set of
exclusionary rights that ensure a reasonable level of legal
appropriability.
IV. APPROPRIABILITY AND SERVITUDES
A. The Law of Servitudes
Another longstanding area of property law that reflects rationales
of appropriability, and that demonstrates the erosion of these
rationales due to misconceptions concerning the role of economic
84
analysis in property law, is the law of servitudes. Traditionally, the
common law was generally hostile towards servitudes, but the
manifestation of that hostility was marked by a sharp distinction
85
between servitudes on land and servitudes on other types of assets.
Courts have recognized servitudes on land for many centuries, albeit
subject to multiple limitations on the type, scope, and duration of the
86
servitudes that may be imposed. Private ordering in the post-sale
87
By contrast,
context was thus limited and highly regulated.
servitudes on other types of assets—chattels in general and
intellectual property-based products in particular—have been

83. See Coase, supra note 2, at 8–10 (providing an example of a situation in which
a court’s judgment between conflicting businesses served to promote orderly
apportionment of the use of certain property in the future).
84. A servitude is “a charge or burden on an estate for another’s benefit.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (7th ed. 1999). I will refer to a “servitude” as any
limitation on the use of property that “runs” with the property, i.e., that survives the
sale of the property to another.
85. See infra notes 89 and 92 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1982) (“Private arrangements that bind
particular burdens or benefits to the occupier of land have been known to the
common law since medieval times.”).
87. See, e.g., id. at 1265 (“Because these devices are both useful and dangerous,
courts have responded to them with understandable ambivalence, allowing their use
at some times, for some purposes, for some people, and preventing their use for
others.”).
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rejected outright by the courts. Two major studies by Zechariah
Chaffee, performed in 1928 and 1956, demonstrated how, for
hundreds of years, the common law held that servitudes on chattels
harm commerce because they restrict alienation, remove assets from
89
the stream of commerce, and are anticompetitive. Chaffee noted
that common law courts had repeatedly found that servitudes on
90
chattels violated public policy and were unenforceable. Servitudes
on intellectual property products have similarly been rejected, albeit
under a unique doctrine—the first-sale doctrine, also known as the
exhaustion doctrine. As developed by the Supreme Court in the late
19th century, the first-sale doctrine holds that once a product
manufactured under a patent or copyright is sold to another, the
seller no longer holds an intellectual property right to restrict further
resale (in the case of both patent and copyright) or use (in the case
91
92
of patent rights only ) of that specific product.
In recent years, however, the property doctrines curtailing post-sale
encumbrances have lost much of their force. This is perhaps best
seen in the intellectual property field. The first-sale doctrine, which
was developed as a bright-line property rule that delineates the rights
of individuals in assets vis-à-vis the world at large, was recast by courts
as an (intellectual property-related) antitrust doctrine focused on the
93
competitive effects of bilateral vertical agreements. Consequently,
the change in economic and legal assessment of vertical restraints led
94
courts to conclude that the doctrine is based on shaky foundations,
88. See Zachariah Chaffee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945,
954–56 (1928) (reviewing the consistent practice of modern courts, both in the
United States and in England, of striking down equitable servitudes on chattels).
89. Id. at 987–89; Zachariah Chaffee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable
Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1261–62 (1956). Servitudes on land
have attracted more analysis, some of which will be discussed in further detail.
90. Chaffee, supra note 88, at 954–56.
91. The issue of use was never raised in the context of copyright because the
right to use the copyrighted work was never one of the exclusive enumerated rights
under the copyright laws. Therefore, traditional copyright jurisprudence considered
any restriction on use (other than restrictions against specific uses such as broadcast,
etc., that are expressly allowed under the Copyright Act) to be outside the scope of
the copyright grant.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner,
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.” (emphasis added)).
93. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
94. In a string of decisions spanning the last thirty years, the Supreme Court
gradually declared every type of vertical restraint (most recently including vertical
resale price maintenance) to be subject to a rule of reason analysis, overturning
decades of decisions treating such restrictions as per se illegal under the antitrust
laws. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2718–20
(2007) (holding that vertical minimum price fixing is not per se illegal), overruling
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causing its near demise. Similar developments have taken place—
albeit to a lesser extent—in connection with servitudes on land and
96
on chattels. These jurisprudential developments deserve a more
thorough analysis than the one I will offer here. At this juncture,
I wish to take issue with a notion that seems to have allowed courts to
get away with the implementation of these far reaching changes to
the law with very little analysis, namely that servitudes are somehow a
97
“natural” incidence of ownership.
The appropriability analysis,
properly applied, indicates that traditional servitude rules were fully
justified. Servitudes may be justified in certain contexts, such as the
real estate context, but are clearly not part of any core notion of
property rights.
B. Property and Contract: Two Levels of Property Rules
The preceding sections have demonstrated that property rules
operate on two distinct levels. On one level, private property rules
operate first and foremost to ensure legal appropriability and prevent
poaching—to solve the appropriability problem—while residually, as
a consequence, allocating some use rights. These are basic roles that
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18–19 (1997) (holding that vertical maximum resale price fixing is
not per se illegal), overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Cont’l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (holding that vertical geographic
division of markets is not per se illegal), overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
95. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding that patentees may impose servitudes on patented goods, and that previous
first-sale cases stood only for the proposition that no such encumbrances apply as a
default). But see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115–22
(2008) (holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents manufacturers from
asserting patent rights after an item’s initial authorized sale). In the copyright field,
courts allowed software manufacturers to completely evade the doctrine by finding
that software is “licensed” rather than sold to end users. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v.
Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(requiring that a party trace the purchase of a product to an authorized seller in
order to invoke the first-sale doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement);
Microsoft Corp. v. ATS Computers, No. 93-1273, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21132,
*16–18 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (determining that products distributed through licenses, not
sales, are ineligible to invoke the first-sale doctrine); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that the first-sale
doctrine applies only when a copyright holder has sold his work, but he retains
control over distribution when his work has only been licensed).
96. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449,
1464–80 (2004) (noting several cases that have relaxed or ignored the rule against
servitudes on chattels); A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern Is Dead, Long Live the
Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REV. 804, 812 (1998) (discussing the abandonment of the
requirement in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes that servitudes on
land “touch and concern” the servient land).
97. See Robinson, supra note 96, at 1462 (arguing that a fundamental concept in
property rights is the ability to restrict use embedded within the ability to transfer).
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every private property regime must fulfill. On this level, property’s
rigidity, “thingness”, and in rem nature are most apparent.
98
On a second, “higher” level, property rules sometimes operate
specifically to allocate use rights in situations where transaction costs
are substantial, i.e., where contractual mechanisms for the allocation
or reallocation of use rights break down. In this role, property rules
become much more nuanced and complex: such rules attempt to
emulate contractual allocations and to strike a delicate balance
between the benefits of finely-tuned allocations and the information
and administrative costs associated with deviations from the relatively
clear “thingness” model of property. In these situations, the main
goal of such allocative property rules is not to solve any of the
overarching problems that we have identified; instead, these rules are
intended to solve idiosyncratic problems that essentially lie in the
realm of contract law.
This distinction is illustrated in Figures I and II below. In Figure I,
property rules operate to ensure legal appropriability and exclusivity
of use, and nothing more; once these are achieved, owners are free to
utilize the upper layer—contract law—to transact with proximate
parties for the efficient exploitation of their mutual resources.
In Figure II, property rules still ensure legal appropriability and
exclusivity of use (as they must). However, in certain discrete
instances, where the second layer—contract law—fails, governmental
regulation utilizes property-like rules to overcome these failures and
extend certain use rights that emulate contractual transactions.
Importantly, in this second level, these property rules do not facilitate
contracts, but rather replace them.

This distinction should guide our determinations regarding the
optimal scope of property rights. In general, their scope should be
limited to the assurance to owners of appropriability and exclusivity
of use. Deviations from this baseline must be justified either by the
problems underlying private property at large (namely the
98. I refer to this level as “higher” because it assumes the existence of, and builds
upon, the first “lower” level.
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appropriability problem and the tragedy of the commons), or by a
specific breakdown in the contracting mechanism that requires
realignment of use rights.
This insight allows us to better evaluate the place of servitudes
within property law, i.e., whether they can justifiably be considered to
be a normal or integral instance of ownership. Importantly, I do not
attempt at this juncture to evaluate the desirability of servitudes, or
any other type of property-type, post-sale restrictions in any given
situation. My point is much more modest: simply put, servitudes and
other post-sale restrictions cannot be justified by either of the two
overarching problems that underlie property regimes. By definition,
because they operate post-sale, i.e., post- appropriation, they have
nothing to do with exclusivity of use, nor can they promote
protection against poaching. Of course, it is possible that the
availability of servitudes would increase a seller’s return in a given
situation, i.e., increase her economic appropriability. However, as noted,
economic appropriability should not guide us in determining the
99
scope of property rights. It is also possible that servitudes would be
welfare-enhancing in certain instances, because of some breakdown
in the contractual mechanism that they help to overcome; the
following section suggests that this is exactly the case in the field of
real property. However, an idiosyncratic failure of contracts cannot
justify an overarching principle of property law. Absent some direct
link between servitudes and either of the problems underlying
property regimes in general, servitudes have no place as part of any
baseline notion of property rights; they operate entirely at the
“higher” level of property regimes.
C. The Case of Real Property
The former conclusion begs the question of real property
servitudes. Real property servitudes, after all, are a well-established
common law institution dating back to the sixteenth century (and as
such, are heavily relied on by commentators for the conclusion that
100
servitudes are a “normal” instance of ownership). If servitudes are
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (purporting that a specific focus on
allocation of use rights lies in the realm of contract law, and should not be the basis
of defining a property regime).
100. English courts first recognized covenants that run with the land—i.e., that
bind subsequent assignees—in Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583). Robinson
recognizes this unique justification for servitudes on land, and also concedes that
these have no direct counterpart in personal property, but nonetheless contends that
the distinction between real and personal (or intellectual) property is “not . . .
substantively important.” Robinson, supra note 96, at 1461.
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not an integral part of property, as I argue, one might wonder why
servitudes on land have successfully survived as a legal institution for
the last five centuries. The explanation, I believe, lies in the special
nature of land as an asset; the inherent interdependence between
tracts of land leads to an idiosyncratic breakdown in contractual
mechanisms—the very type of breakdown that the former section
suggested would justify an extension of property rules beyond their
appropriability-based baseline in certain situations. Real property
servitudes thus reinforce, and may be seen as an example of, the
foregoing analysis.
I have argued elsewhere that property-type, post-sale restrictions
are generally justified wherever a seller retains a legitimate interest in
101
the very thing that it sells, regardless of the title thereto.
For example, I have argued that sellers of copyrighted goods should
be allowed to impose property-type, post-sale restrictions that would
protect the integrity of their works where—and only where—
mutilation of these works (post sale) would undermine the
reputation of the seller and impact the value of her entire body of
102
work. The underlying idea that guides this proposition is that some
assets are inherently interdependent, i.e., their nature is such that the
use made of one asset (a work of art, for instance) affects, or even
controls, the value of others (other works of art by the same artist).
Real estate fits this bill perfectly, and is probably the quintessential
interdependent asset. The “neighborhood effects” associated with
real estate cause the use of any tract of land to have direct and
immediate effects on the value of neighboring tracts. It is therefore
not surprising that the early, paradigmatic cases involving real
property servitudes involved two-party transactions where the owner
of a large tract of land sold off one parcel of that tract while retaining
others, thereby effectively transacting to share the larger tract with
103
the buyer and her assignees. The interdependence of the two assets
is central to these transactions; if the seller could not ensure that the
101. Yonatan Even, The Right of Integrity in Software: An Economic Analysis, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 219, 253 (2006) (focusing on the nature of
particular chattels which give rise to a continued economic interest of the seller after
the sale). The context there was the right of sellers to protect the integrity of
copyrighted works they have sold, which is widely recognized in civil law countries as
part of artists’ droit moral and that was recognized by statute in the United States with
regard to certain visual works of art. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650 § 601, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2007)) (providing
federal copyright protection to moral rights of artists, regardless of physical
ownership).
102. See Even, supra note 101, at 253.
103. See Tarlock, supra note 96, at 812 (noting that the central servitude model has
been the two-party “use sharing” system).
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sold parcel would never be used in a way that would damage the
seller’s remaining tract, she would refrain from entering into the
transaction in the first place. As recognized by the Chancery Court in
104
Tulk v. Moxhay, this conclusion was the raison d’être for enforcement
of real property servitudes:
That this Court has jurisdiction to enforce a contract between the
owner of land and his neighbour purchasing a part of it, that the
latter shall either use or abstain from using the land purchased in a
particular way, is what I never knew disputed . . . it is . . .
contended, not that the vendee could violate that contract, but that
he might sell the piece of land, and that the purchaser from him
may violate it without this Court having any power to interfere.
If that were so, it would be impossible for an owner of land to sell part of it
105
without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless.

In recent years, the law of real property servitudes has been applied
to slightly different, multi-party settings involving residential
106
community associations (RCAs).
This change in application does
not undermine the basic analysis. As in the two-party model,
individuals living in RCAs opt to share a given space—be it a
107
condominium, a gated community, or another type of RCA.
Real estate developers, who initially own these residences in their
entirety, stand in a unique position because they hold all the
foreseeable future interests of the association in unified form before
the interests become dispersed between several residents and thus
104. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
105. Id. at 1144 (emphasis added). The case involved the sale of London’s
Leicester Square by the original owner of that square and several adjoining houses.
Id. at 1143. The sale was made under condition that the buyer and his assignees shall
maintain the square as a garden for the enjoyment of the residents of the adjoining
houses, i.e., the seller and his tenants. Id. The case was brought after a subsequent
buyer of the square announced his intention to build houses upon it, arguing that he
was not privy to the original covenant. Id. at 1143–44. Note that the problem
discussed in the case is not dissimilar to an appropriability problem—a failure to
ensure the future of an investment results in under-utilization of resources.
106. See Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1177, 1184 (1982) (noting the prevalent use of servitudes during the twentieth
century to regulate private residential subdivisions and communities); Tarlock, supra
note 96, at 812 (evaluating the modern use of servitudes in common interest
communities as a vitally important tool to “enhance the quality of living for their
members and help guarantee the value of the property investment”). RCAs
(sometimes also referred to as common interest communities) have become
tremendously popular in the United States over the last thirty-five years, their
number leaping from a mere 10,000 communities housing a little over two million
residents in 1970, to a whopping 300,800 communities housing about 59.5 million
residents in 2008. COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE, INDUSTRY DATA: NATIONAL
STATISTICS (2009), http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx.
107. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 106, at 1184 (discussing how a system
permitting individuals to enter into free market transactions to share and allocate
common use rights promotes efficiency).
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susceptible to corrupt incentives. Developers therefore use servitudes
to write “constitutions” for such associations that would run with the
residences, regardless of changes in tenancy. In this way, they
coordinate ex ante between multiple subsequent buyers in an effort to
prevent coordination problems, opportunistic behavior, and other
108
problems resembling tragedies of the commons ex post.
In both the traditional two-party setting and the RCA setting,
efficient utilization of resources thus requires legal mechanisms that
attach to assets and “run” with them. Contract law, however, was
designed to attach to individuals, not assets. Specifically, contract
law’s privity requirement is intended to prevent contracts from
obliging anyone who was not party to the “meeting of the minds” that
formed the contract, and courts have traditionally held that assignees
109
of the original buyer of servient lands were members of that class.
Courts were thus faced with a breakdown in contractual doctrine, the
results of which created clear inefficiencies in allocation of resources.
Courts could have solved these problems within contract law
doctrine, for instance, by relaxing the privity requirement in certain
situations.
However, the problems that arise due to
interdependencies between assets do resemble the appropriability
and tragedies of the commons problems underlying property law.
108. As many commentators have noted, the rulemaking powers of the
developer—and, subsequently, of the association—raise considerable concerns with
regard to the powers’ encroachment on general constitutional rights of tenants and
would-be tenants, as well as their effects on the role of local governments. See, e.g.,
Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other
Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 204
(1992) (noting that “[a]s common interest developments proliferate, their
characteristics as residential governments pose questions about longstanding
relationships between the individual and the community, and of private groups to
the public as a whole”); Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential
Government Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346–47 (1992)
(highlighting the substantial loss of freedom that property owners in common
interest communities must give up, juxtaposed by developers’ nearly limitless ability
to create restrictions as embodied in associations’ constitutions); Steven Siegel,
The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights
in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 461, 468–70 (1998) (detailing the significant lack of bargaining power that
homebuyers in today’s housing market possess, giving RCAs considerable and largely
un-checked authority to impose restrictive servitudes); Angel M. Traub, Comment,
The Wall Is Down, Now We Build More: The Exclusionary Effects of Gated Communities
Demand Stricter Burdens Under the FHA, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 379, 382–83 (2000)
(discussing use restrictions employed in common interest developments, and
particularly in gated communities that are developed and carried out by housing
associations and can govern the use and tenancy of the property).
109. See Reichman, supra note 106, at 1213–14 (explaining the development of the
law from the requirement of privity of contract to property’s privity of estate,
providing a specific exception allowing an obligation to bind a person not party to
the contract).
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Moreover, property law’s in rem nature provided a simple, though
overbroad, solution to the shortcomings of the proximity
requirement. In property law, the right of an owner is good against
the world, and thus is also good against any assignees of a buyer
under a property-type post sale restriction, or servitude. It should
therefore come as no surprise that most courts have extended
property law to solve what started out as a problem with contract
110
doctrine.
And yet, courts never considered this extension to
represent anything like a “natural incidence” of ownership; far from
it. In fact, courts have been painfully aware that real property
servitudes are an exceptional mechanism, and have allowed them
only in certain discrete situations. Most notably, following Spencer’s
111
Case and Tulk v. Moxhay, courts have required that servitudes “touch
112
and concern” both the servient and the dominant tracts. However
vague that requirement is, it does ensure that servitudes can only be
imposed in cases of interdependence where the use of the servient
tract directly affects the dominant tract and property-type PSRs are
113
thus justified. Real property servitudes that “run” with the land are
therefore an exception to the scope of ownership, and not a natural
114
incidence thereof.
110. In the United States, equitable servitudes like those recognized in Tulk v.
Moxhay were initially regarded by courts as contractual, i.e., as “obligations
specifically enforced in equity against third party [with notice thereof].” Id. at 1226.
Thus, courts used equity to circumvent the shortcomings of the proximity
requirement. Eventually, however, these servitudes—along with easements and real
covenants—came to be regarded as interests in land. Id. at 1225–27.
111. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
112. See Tarlock, supra note 96, at 817–21 (providing a brief overview of courts’
treatment and application of the “touch and concern” test, requiring that the
covenant must relate to the physical use of the land and that the original grantor
must have intended the burden to “run with the land”).
113. Relying on the Restatement (Third) of Property, which substituted certain
reasonableness tests for the longstanding touch and concern doctrine, Robinson
suggests that the doctrine no longer applies to real property servitudes.
See Robinson, supra note 96, at 1461 n.36. Robinson ignores the fact that the
Restatement’s position was harshly criticized when it was first adopted. See, e.g.,
Tarlock, supra note 96, at 811 (noting that “the Restatement . . . strikes out in a new
direction that has quite limited academic and judicial support”). Additionally, the
Restatement failed to eradicate the use of the doctrine by the courts. See Ben W.F.
Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights:
A Functional
Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS Issue 1, art. 2, 11 & 11
n.31 (2003), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss1/art2/
(noting, based on a survey of decisions found on Lexis, that “despite the[] efforts by
scholars and the drafters of the Third Restatement, touch and concern remains is
[sic] very much alive in the case law today” and is “a permanent fixture in the case
law on land use arrangements”).
114. Richard Epstein argued that the only limitation on the scope and context of
servitudes should be the availability of a reliable recordation system that would give
adequate notice to third parties, and that the information costs associated with such
recordation systems stand at the basis of the distinction between servitudes on land
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Could servitudes be justified in other instances, outside the real
property context? Of course. However, such an extension cannot be
simply transferred from the realm of real property, nor can it rely on
property notions. Real property servitudes essentially operate in the
realm of contract law. To extend their application, one would have
to be convinced that similar breakdowns of the contractual
mechanism plague the relevant context (such as in the case of certain
works of art). At least facially, no such general proposition can be
made in connection with either chattels or intellectual property
products. Thus, the traditional common law distinction between
servitudes on land and servitudes on other types of property seems to
accurately reflect the calls of legal appropriability.
V. APPROPRIABILITY AND TAKINGS
The last area of law that I focus on, the law of takings, is rather
unique. Regulatory takings, it should be noted, stand outside regular
notions of ownership and the conveyance of property; they are
involuntary transfers that are the result of centralistic planning and
have little to do with free market mechanisms. Nonetheless, takings
are very relevant to any discussion of property rights. Indeed, some
of the most elaborate academic and judicial discussions regarding the
scope and protection of property rights under U.S. law revolve
around the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, arguably the Constitution’s foremost manifestation of
115
substantive protection of property rights.
(where recordation is relatively easy) and servitudes on chattels (where, according to
Epstein, recordation would be costly due to the dynamic nature of the underlying
assets). Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1353–55 (1982). Epstein’s analysis, I believe, confuses cause and
effect. To be sure, information costs played a part in the development of
recordation systems. However, recordation systems are very costly and affect the
owners of all assets, even those that are not encumbered. Moreover, as Epstein
acknowledges, servitudes on land were recognized by courts long before the
emergence of reliable recordation systems. Id. at 1354. Recordation systems are
therefore best viewed not as a reason for the distinction between servitudes on land
and on chattels, but rather as an administrative solution that was created in response
to the real necessity in servitudes on land that was recognized by courts.
115. Although substantive property rights can be, and occasionally have been,
found under the Due Process Clause, in recent decades the focus of substantive
constitutional protection of property rights has shifted squarely to the Takings
Clause, either alone (where the federal government is concerned) or, in most cases,
in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (where states
are involved). See JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 92 (2003)
(“Now that substantive due process is almost exclusively concerned with
noneconomic rights, the takings clause has gained new salience in economic cases.”);
see also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 119 (2001) (observing that constitutional protection of property rights
can also be found in the Third Amendment (protection against quartering soldiers
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The Fifth Amendment, in rather laconic fashion, forbids
governmental takings of private property (for public use) without just
116
compensation. It appears clear from the text of the Clause that it
should apply to outright condemnation of property by the
government. However, its applicability to governmental acts, which
fall short of outright condemnation but nevertheless have adverse
effects on the value of private property, is nowhere as clear.
For nearly a century courts and commentators alike have grappled
with this question, trying to demarcate a distinction between
compensable and noncompensable governmental regulation of
117
property.
In the following pages, I examine the role of
appropriability in this demarcation exercise; the definition of a
“taking” of “property”, I argue, is informed, to a large extent, by basic
intuitions about appropriability and its role in the law of property.
A. Current Supreme Court Law
A complete analysis of current takings jurisprudence is beyond the
scope of this paper. For present purposes, an overview of the
Supreme Court’s discussion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

on private property), the Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable
search and seizure of property), the Eighth Amendment (protection against
excessive bails and fines), and, according to some commentators, also in the Second
and Seventh Amendments (the right to keep and bear arms and the right to a jury
trial for economically substantial controversies)).
116. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
117. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435–40 (1982) (law requiring landlords to allow placement of cable boxes on their
property constitutes a compensable taking); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67
(1979) (prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers is not a compensable taking); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (law prohibiting the
plaintiff from constructing an office building above its train terminal was not a taking
of air rights, because it did not interfere with the terminal’s current use or the
plaintiff’s ability to obtain a reasonable financial return on its investment); Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (law prohibiting the extraction of
underground coal deposits that might harm buildings on the surface constitutes a
compensable taking, because “mak[ing] it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it”); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412 (1915)
(law prohibiting the operation of a brickyard was not a compensable taking because
it did not prohibit the extraction of clay from which bricks were produced); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887) (law prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic
beverages was not a compensable taking of property, but rather “a declaration by the
state that its use . . . for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
interests”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the distinction
between compensable and non compensable takings revolves around “essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries,” Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, and depends mostly “upon the
particular circumstances [of the particular] case,” United States v. Cent. Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
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118

Council is sufficiently illustrative of the meandering route taken by
119
Lucas revolved around the 1988 South
the Court on this issue.
Carolina Beachfront Management Act, which purported to regulate
the use of South Carolina’s beach line by prohibiting construction of
120
“occupiable improvements” upon certain oceanfront properties.
The plaintiff, David Lucas, had purchased two oceanfront lots prior
to the Act’s enactment, and intended to use them for the
121
construction of two single-family homes.
Lucas filed suit and the
trial court found that the Act effectively deprived Lucas “of any
reasonable economic use of the lots . . . and rendered them
122
valueless.”
The question before the Supreme Court was whether
this effect of the statute’s regulations constituted a taking that
entitled Lucas to just compensation, even though Lucas retained
123
possession of the lots.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, noted that early decisions took
a narrow view of the Takings Clause, limiting its reach only to “direct
appropriation” of property or the functional equivalent of an “ouster
124
of the owner’s possession.” The Court first departed from this view
125
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where Justice Holmes, invoking
the fear of a slippery slope effect whereby “the natural tendency of
human nature [would be] to extend the [regulatory] qualification
126
more and more until at last private property disappeared,” held

118. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
119. See id. at 1014–19, 1022–26 (discussing in detail the Court’s previous
holdings, and emphasizing that its decision in this case was not meant to overrule
precedent).
120. Id. at 1008–09.
121. Id. at 1008.
122. Id. at 1009 (quoting appendix to petition for certiorari).
123. The trial court’s findings were the basis for grant of certiorari in the case.
However, following a hearing, four of the justices raised serious doubts as to its
correctness. See id. at 1033–34 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asking whether a
permanent taking had actually occurred and whether Lucas’s property had been
“rendered valueless”); id. at 1046–47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (questioning why the
Court issued a new categorical rule to decide a very narrow case, given the nuisance
caveat); id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting a “fundamental
weakness in the Court’s analysis: its failure to explain why only the impairment of
‘economically beneficial or productive use’ . . . of property is relevant in takings
analysis,” which is an arbitrary distinction) (emphasis in original); id. at 1076
(Souter, J., dissenting) (opining that certiorari was improperly granted because the
“questionable conclusion of total deprivation cannot be reviewed”).
124. Id. at 1014 (quoting the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870)
and Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878)).
125. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
126. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)).
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that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
127
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
The Court in Lucas extended this view and created a rule whereby
any regulation that “denies all economically beneficial or productive
128
use of land” is categorically a compensable taking, with one
exception: where such regulation prohibits use that constitutes a
common law nuisance, and therefore only prohibits uses that the
owner was never entitled to (nor had a reasonable expectation to be
129
130
entitled to). In response to criticism from one dissenting Justice,
the Court acknowledged the possibility that regulation which falls
short of complete deprivation of all value of affected properties may
also be compensable in some rare cases, but refrained from outlining
the circumstances that might result in such compensation being
131
awarded.
Instead, the Court emphasized the broad power of
government to affect property values by regulation without incurring
132
an obligation to compensate.
Furthermore, the Court limited its
holding to regulation of land, finding that regulation of uses of
personal property can never constitute a compensable taking “by
reason of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over
commercial dealings [which should have made owners] aware of the
possibility that new regulation might even render [their personal]
133
property economically worthless . . . .”

127. Id.
128. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
129. See id. at 1029 (discussing, as an example, how a lake bed owner might not
receive compensation when he is denied a landfill permit that would result in
flooding others’ property).
130. See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that according to the Court’s
new “arbitrary” rule, a “landowner whose property is diminished in value 95%
recovers nothing, while an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the
land’s full value.”).
131. See id. at 1019 n.5 (majority opinion) (noting that although an owner whose
property value is diminished by 95% may not be able to benefit from the new
categorical rule, she may still be compensated if investment-backed expectations are
taken into account).
132. See id. at 1022–23 (explaining states’ police power to regulate public nuisance
activities).
133. Id. at 1027–28. Justice Blackmun, in an elaborate dissenting opinion, found
even this narrow rule to be too restrictive. See id. at 1047–48 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Under his view, any regulation that is aimed at preventing some public
harm will not be a compensable taking, but rather a legitimate exercise of the states’
police power, regardless of its effect on the value of the affected properties. See id.
For an extensive critique of Justice Blackmun’s position, see SIEGAN, supra note 115,
at 180.
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B. The Role of Appropriability in Takings
Although Lucas lacks any in-depth analysis of the underlying
rationales for its holding, the decision can best be read as reflecting
the Court’s appropriability-based intuitions about the nature and
substance of property ownership and property law. In this context,
I do not argue that appropriability requires compensation for certain
governmental takings, whether outright or regulatory; the question of
whether compensation is just or efficient has more to do with one’s
view of the role of the State (and one’s faith in the democratic
process to adequately fulfill that role) than in traditional notions of
property and appropriability. In fact, one could make a perfectly
valid argument that appropriability does not require constitutional
134
protection of property rights at all.
Thus, I make here a more
134. Property rights operate mainly against other individuals. By contrast, the role
of property rights is nowhere near as clear in the relationship between an individual
and the State. As already mentioned, the appropriability problem only has to do
with internalizing benefits, not costs. State regulation may also be required to
prevent hold-up problems when efficient projects affect the properties of several
owners. Thus, one could argue that governmental intervention, by definition,
should only occur where the asset that is taken would be put to better, more efficient
use by the government than by its lawful owner. If this argument is followed to its
logical conclusion, any appropriability problem created by potential governmental
takings is, in fact, not a problem at all, because it does not lead to under-utilization of
resources. Instead, the level of utilization by the private owner would reflect the fact
that the asset would likely be regulated or condemned by the government to ensure
a more efficient use thereof. It is therefore not surprising that government is
routinely allowed to regulate, tax, and even condemn private property.
The argument against substantive constitutional protection of property rights is
strongest where the governmental regulation was already in place, or was reasonably
expected to become effective, when the owner of the asset first acquired the affected
property. This argument is in line with our analysis, since the appropriability
problem and its corrupt effect on incentives cannot arise in any meaningful sense
where there is no legitimate expectation to derive a profit from an asset.
This argument, however, becomes more tenuous in transition periods, i.e., in times
when new regulation is introduced or new condemnation is effectuated. On the one
hand, transitions may clearly raise appropriability problems, thus skewing the
incentives of owners. On the other hand, compensating owners for inefficient uses,
which they have undertaken in reliance upon their ability to externalize costs and
the availability of future compensation for any new regulation, would also skew the
incentives of owners. See, e.g., Lawrence L. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 578 (1984)
(noting that State regulation may be required to internalize costs associated with
certain uses of resources, most specifically when such uses have spillovers that harm a
resource that either cannot be effectively parceled—e.g., the seas, the air, etc.—
or whose ownership is too dispersed to effectively negotiate the efficient level of
usage); Lawrence L. Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land:
When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 81–82 (1984) (asserting that
oftentimes the decision to take property is dependent upon how the current private
owner uses the land; for instance, highway planners seem to choose routes that will
pass through a slum, alluding to the idea that a highway is a more efficient use of
land than a slum); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 582–92 (1986) (discussing different types of transition mechanisms,
including direct compensation, grandfather provisions, and partial, delayed, and
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modest proposition, namely that under current constitutional law
and its express protection of property rights against governmental
takings, the scope of protection is determined, by and large, using
the same appropriability-based principles that demarcate property
rights in the private. Thus, takings clause jurisprudence is treated by
the courts as an extension of the laws of property; as such, courts
incorporate and apply much of the rationale of the appropriability
analysis.
I have argued in the preceding sections that economic
appropriability is focused on owners’ security from poaching of the
fruits of their labor. By contrast, legal appropriability has very little to
say about the right of owners (or lack thereof) to use their assets in a
certain way—for example, to raise cattle, grow wheat, or build a
condominium. Indeed, this was noted to be a major difference
between legal and economic appropriability. Whereas economic
appropriability would require that owners be allowed to put their
assets to any use (or at least to the assets’ most lucrative use) to
maximize revenues, legal appropriability does not call for the
protection of one’s right to a specific use of one’s assets. Instead,
legal appropriability requires only an assurance that once an owner
uses her assets in a certain (legal) manner, she would be able to enjoy
the fruits of such use without the threat of poaching.
Compare, then, the requirements of legal appropriability with the
Supreme Court’s takings analysis. As a general matter, it seems clear
that the emphasis of the Court in Lucas, like that of the
appropriability analysis, is focused on freedom from “poaching”—in
that case, in the form of a regulatory taking—and not on any right to
phased-in implementation of a new regulation).
Ultimately, the approach toward the necessity to compensate individuals for
governmental takings depends on one’s relative optimism about the incorruptible
and efficient functioning of government compared to the functioning of information
markets and of market-based insurance. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra, at 528 (arguing that
the effects of transitions can most efficiently be mitigated through a market for
insurance, based on a model government whose regulation is always welfarepromoting (even as its capacity for effectively supplying efficient insurance is
questioned)); see also William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 269, 276 (1988) (noting that Kaplow assumes a Pigovian government, i.e., one
that has all the information and incentives to act efficiently). By contrast, for
Richard A. Epstein, the epicenter of takings jurisprudence is not in the incentives of
owners, but rather in the incentives of government itself. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 199–200 (1985)
(assuming that government regulation would generally be motivated by rent-seeking
on the part of a ruling sect); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the
Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1584–85 (1986) (contrasting Epstein’s
pessimistic view of the state with Kaplow’s optimism about the role of public
institutions).

1462

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1417

use property in a given way. Thus, any direct appropriation by the
government, e.g., an ouster of possession, would require just
compensation; government is not allowed to poach for itself (and the
public) benefits that flow from the investments made by private
persons in their privately held property. By contrast, under Lucas,
the government may freely regulate the usage of private property,
and outside the narrow rule announced by the Court, such
regulation shall not constitute a compensable violation of property
135
rights, regardless of its economic effects on privately held assets.
The right to exclusive use (i.e., use that is free of poaching) is fully
protected; the right to freedom of use in a given way receives no
protection at all.
Turning to examine the implications of Lucas in more detail, its
correlation with the appropriability analysis becomes even more
striking. Consider, for instance, the following examples, which
represent a sliding-scale of encroachment upon owners’ rights under
both Lucas and the appropriability analysis:
First, assume that a hypothetical rancher bought land for the
purpose of building her cattle ranch. As she prepares to build the
ranch, it transpires that the raising of cattle at the specific spot would
contaminate a major underground aquifer held in common, and that
such contamination would cost more to society than the value of any
contaminating use of the land adjacent to the aquifer. The State,
therefore, enacts a regulation demanding that “contaminating
users”—including cattle ranchers—line their land with plastic sheets
136
to minimize the risk of contamination. The cost of lining the land
would obviously render cattle-raising less profitable; assume, however,
that the cost is not prohibitive.
Under Lucas, such a regulation would clearly not be considered a
137
compensable taking.
A look at the appropriability analysis gives a
clear explanation to that ruling. Arguably, the regulation denies the
farmer her most lucrative use of the land—contaminating cattle135. The categorical rule announced by the Court does not necessarily deviate
from the analysis. See supra Part V.A (discussing states’ broad power to police public
nuisances).
136. An underground aquifer, being held in common, would generally require
protection through state regulation; private ordering would usually be prohibitively
costly and would raise the hold-out problems associated with tragedies of the
commons.
137. Contamination would be akin to a public nuisance, that the State may
regulate to mitigate harm to the public that would occur if the aquifer were
contaminated. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1021 (1992) (listing
several examples of cases in which the Court found laws to be nuisance prohibiting,
including a law banning the manufacture of alcoholic beverages, and laws preventing
operation of a brick yard and a quarry in residential areas).
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raising—thereby diminishing her economic appropriability. However,
her legal appropriability would remain unchanged. To the extent
that her right to exclude is protected, she will still be able to
appropriate all the revenues associated with her allowed use of the
land as a cattle ranch; no direct appropriability problem would arise
and the rancher would not refrain from cattle-raising due to an
externality.
Second, assume that the cost of lining renders cattle-raising less
profitable
than
an
alternative,
substantially
profitable,
noncontaminating use such as wheat growing. This alternative use
would clearly not affect the result of the previous scenario under
138
Lucas. Nor would it alter the preceding appropriability analysis; the
fact that the rancher would have to switch uses (or sell the land to
another who specializes in wheat growing) is immaterial. As in the
first scenario above, the farmer’s economic appropriability would be
diminished; however, no legal appropriability problem arises,
because the rancher may still appropriate all the revenues that may
be derived from her main use of the land—this time, wheat
growing—without actual or potential poaching.
Third, assume that the regulation renders cattle-raising
unprofitable, and that no alternative, substantially profitable use for
the land exists. This scenario is the hard case that led the Lucas court
to find an exception to the general rule against compensation for
139
regulation.
This exception can also be explained in terms of
appropriability, because the quantitative differences from the
preceding scenarios do have qualitative implications that ultimately
raise appropriability-like problems. Indeed, such a regulation can
justifiably be said to be akin to poaching.
The qualitative difference between this scenario and the previous
scenarios should be plain to see; at least in a constructive (and in an
economic) sense, we can certainly say that the land has been
effectively dedicated to the public. Indeed, whereas the previous
scenarios contemplated a situation whereby the State forbids or raises
the cost of one (or a few) uses of the rancher’s land, in the present
scenario the State takes effective control of the land by dictating to
the rancher that her land’s main use must be to serve as a shelter to
the aquifer. Obviously, it is the public at large, and not the rancher,
138. The growing of wheat would be an economically profitable use of the land,
unlike the building of a house in Lucas, which had no viable economic use. Id. at
1020.
139. See id. (emphasizing that Lucas’s property had been “rendered valueless” with
“no economically viable use”).
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that appropriates the benefits from that main use. In many senses,
the public therefore poached all the fruits of ownership from the
rancher, leaving her with an economically empty shell of legal title.
140
This scenario thus clearly creates an appropriability-like problem.
Finally, assume that the underground aquifer is so crucial to the
State, that the State takes possession of the land over it. This scenario
has always been the clearest case under the Takings Clause, and Lucas
141
has done nothing to change that.
Similarly, this case is clearly
analogous with the worst kind of private-sphere poaching: the owner
is denied of all rights in the land, clearly undermining both
economic and legal appropriability.
C. A Comment on Harms and Benefits
The preceding section makes clear the similarity between the
appropriability analysis and the current takings jurisprudence. At the
same time, the analogy to current takings jurisdiction also exposes
the distinction between economic and legal appropriability to a
critique whereby it relies on a misplaced distinction between harms
142
and benefits.
The gist of this critique would be that one cannot
determine whether regulations such as the one discussed in the
examples prevent harms (e.g., the harm of contamination), or secure
benefits (e.g., the benefit of pure water). Thus, the argument might
go, the regulation contemplated in the first and second examples
above diminishes legal appropriability because it secures to the
public, and not the farmer, a benefit resulting from the farmer’s
140. This is an appropriability-like problem, and not an actual appropriability
problem, specifically because the poaching is done by the public at large and, as
presumed here, is itself intended to prevent an externality. See supra note 134 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept of appropriability). The reason that this
is an appropriability-like problem can be understood by an analogy to the private
sphere. The first and second scenarios are akin to an event that renders certain uses
a private nuisance; such an event may be a change in the law, but it may also be the
arrival of a new neighbor. The third scenario, by contrast, is more akin to a situation
wherein a non-owner takes control of an asset and utilizes it to his or her own
benefit, even if he or she does not actually gain title to, or exclusive possession of, the
asset. For a more detailed discussion on the meaning and role of appropriability, see
supra Parts II.A–B.
141. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing cases in which the Court has found that
compensation was due under the Takings Clause, including the Legal Tender Cases,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871) (“direct appropriation” of property), and
Transport Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879) (“practical ouster” of the
landowner)).
142. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (1967)
(contemplating who is “competent to decide that some change in resource would
benefit some people more than it harms others”). For a more substantive discussion
of Michelman’s approach to the law of takings, see infra Part V.D.3.
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permitted conduct that would not be captured by the farmer.
Thus, the argument would posit that—at least in some sense—the
public is poaching some of the benefits of the farmer’s conduct.
This critique suffers from all the shortcomings of the previously
143
discussed nihilistic understanding of property rights.
Indeed, it
completely ignores the import of the parceling mechanism through
144
which private property regimes seek to ensure appropriability.
Private property is all about allocating assets by erecting legal
boundaries between them. As discussed earlier in the context of
“thingness”, if these boundaries are to have any operative
significance, we must assume that the baseline of any private property
regime is that uses of property would be self-contained, i.e., would
not penetrate these boundaries and would not invade—or “spillover”
to—the property of another. This assumption is true with regard to
both physical and conceptual, and to both positive and negative,
spillovers. Thus, if self-contained cattle-raising has no effect on the
aquifer, but contaminating cattle-raising physically invades the
aquifer by discharging chemicals into it, a private property regime
would consider the first use “neutral” and the latter “harmful”; if the
growth of wheat is self- contained, but the growth of coca leaves has
detrimental societal effects due to drug abuse, the former would be
considered neutral and the latter harmful (although the invasion in
the latter is clearly more remote). Similarly, if bees could be raised in
a self-contained manner (e.g., in a glass tank) or, alternatively, be
raised in a field, where they would pollinate crops in adjacent fields,
the former use would be considered neutral, whereas the latter would
confer a benefit. If a painting could be enjoyed by its owner, in her
own living room, or alternatively be presented in a public space and
enjoyed by the public at large, the former would be considered a
neutral use, whereas the latter would confer a benefit on the public
(even though, again, the invasion in the latter case is conceptual and
more remote). Once we understand that property regimes should
and do have a baseline against which harms and benefits can be
evaluated, the nihilistic argument loses much of its power. With a
proper understanding of that baseline, it becomes evident that in the
first and second examples above, the public does not poach a benefit
that derives from the farmer’s (neutral) use; instead, it prevents a
harm that could be the result of the farmer’s activities.

143. See supra Part V.B.
144. For a similar response to this argument, albeit from a slightly different
perspective, see EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 118.
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Naturally, hard cases may be found where the element of invasion
is not conclusive. That, however, does not undermine the basic
analysis. In most cases, as in the cattle-raising example, the
distinction between harms and benefits would be clear, as would be
the distinction between economic and legal appropriability. In this
context, it is important to remember that legal appropriability, as its
name suggests, is a legal, not an economic, concept. Thus, while its
goals are economic—to solve an appropriability problem—its
realization or modus operandi is that of courts exercising their
judicial capacity in protecting legally recognized rights. As such,
attaining legal appropriability is an imperfect and costly endeavor; no
property regime ensures perfect appropriability to owners. At best,
property regimes ensure that benefits stem directly from the main
use of the property, and even then they do so only if such
appropriation is not prohibitively costly (such as in situations where
residual benefits—i.e., benefits that are a side-effect of a
contemplated activity—are bestowed on a large, unspecified
145
public). In the first and second examples, even if we could think of
fresh water as a benefit, it is clearly not the benefit that the farmer
sought to appropriate; the farmer did not intend to use the land
mainly as shelter for the aquifer, and raise cattle thereupon merely as
a secondary endeavor, but rather the very opposite; the farmer’s
main, or even sole, intent was to raise cattle, notwithstanding any
consequences to the aquifer. As long as the farmer was able to
appropriate the benefits that flow directly from her chosen use of her
land, and as long as these are economically substantial, legal
appropriability would be satisfied. We have no reason to believe that
in these circumstances an efficient use would not be undertaken due
146
to externalities that are the result of an appropriability problem.
D. Alternative Property Analyses in the Takings Context
Academic critiques of the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence
are abundant, and a thorough study of them goes well beyond the
scope of this paper. Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court’s
approach reflects intuitions of appropriability, a brief overview of the
145. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (providing an example of residual
benefits).
146. This analysis assumes, of course, that the social choice to keep the aquifer
clean is an efficient one. Note that because the benefit that the regulation ensures is
a constant—i.e., is ensured under any allowed use—the owner would have an
incentive to put the land to the most efficient use; under-investment in such use
would not necessarily occur, and in any case would be limited to the pro-rated share
of the owner in the public benefit of fresh water.
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most prominent critiques of that approach will give a better
perspective of the robustness of the appropriability analysis that
informs it.
1.

Richard Epstein
Richard Epstein critiques the Supreme Court’s approach as being
overly narrow in its protection of property rights. Epstein, invoking
Lockean ethics and echoing Blackstone’s “sole and despotic
147
dominion” language argues that ownership is made up of three
148
equally important instances: possession, use, and disposition.
Thus, whereas appropriability protects only against invasion
(i.e., exclusivity of use), Epstein argues for protection of freedom of
149
use as such.
In appropriability parlance, Epstein is advocating for
the protection of economic appropriability. As applied to takings,
this would mean that any governmental limitation on any tenet of
ownership—including regulation of use or disposition—constitutes a
150
conceptual taking.
The flaw with this approach, at least in its pure form, was discussed
151
earlier in this Article and should by now be self evident. Use rights
tend to clash; moreover, many uses of assets may be inefficient due to
negative externalities. Thus, economic appropriability has little to do
with the problems underlying property regimes and is a poor guide
to the scope of property rights. To counter these shortcomings,
Epstein is quick to qualify the protection of use rights by arguing that,
in the public sphere, states may exercise their police power to affect a
noncompensable taking, where such a taking is necessary to prevent a
152
common law nuisance.
Epstein argues that “the wrong of the
citizen [committing a nuisance] justifies conduct otherwise wrongful
153
by the state as representative of and in defense of its other citizens.”
In other words, conduct that could hypothetically be prevented in a

147. EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 22.
148. See id. at 58–59 (noting that the Supreme Court articulated the same idea in
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377–87 (1945)).
149. See id. at 66 (“Indeed, it is the ability to act at will and without need for
justification within some domain which is the essence of freedom, be it of speech or
of property.”).
150. See id. at 65 (emphasizing that State-placed restrictions on exclusive
possession is a partial taking that requires compensation).
151. See supra Part V.B.
152. See EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 111 (asserting that when a harm threatens a
significant number of people in a population, the State has the sum total of those
people’s individual rights; thus, the police power is the same as an individual acting
on his own behalf).
153. Id.
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private law claim for nuisance may also be prevented by the State,
154
without any compensation requirement.
This exception, tailored to allow regulation of use, brings Epstein’s
rather extreme initial view of property rights closer to the legal
appropriability analysis. Ultimately, it espouses the right of owners to
freely use their property only to the extent that such uses do not
amount to a common law nuisance, i.e., do not unreasonably harm
the property of another. The outcomes suggested by both theories
155
would likely converge in many instances.
However, it is in two
instances where the theories diverge that Epstein’s arguments
ultimately fail.
First, the theories diverge regarding the scope of the government’s
police power. As noted, appropriability does not require protection
156
of property rights against governmental regulation.
If such
protection is deemed necessary, however, it is focused on the right to
enjoy the benefits of use, and not on freedom of use; the government
is thus free to regulate almost without limitation.
Epstein, by contrast, allows the government significantly less
latitude. A self-proclaimed libertarian, Epstein begins his account
with the assertion that libertarian and utilitarian theories of
157
individual rights “tend to converge.”
However, his insistence that
“the government stands no better than the citizens it represents on
whether property has been taken” drives a wedge between the two
154. See id. Epstein offers another, much narrower exception, relating to
situations where the encroachment on the rights of many owners is necessary to
promote a scheme that, on balance, does not diminish the welfare of any affected
owner. Id. at 96. A classic example is that of governmental grants of flight routes to
airlines, whereby the government condemns the high-altitude air space above many
properties, the argument being that the cost to each property owner is smaller than
the benefits she receives from the overall scheme of civic aviation. Id. at 235.
This exception is not really an exception to the general rule regarding takings, but
rather an exception to the general rule regarding the form of compensation paid to
owners. Id. at 195. In such schemes, owners receive implicit compensation in-kind,
through the operation of the overall scheme, instead of explicit compensation in
cash. Id. at 196. Therefore, additional compensation is not required or warranted.
Id.
155. Take, for example, the cattle-raising example used in the previous section.
Assuming that contamination of another’s water supply would be considered a
private law nuisance (as it most probably would, since it involves the harmful physical
invasion of the property of another), both theories would generate identical
outcomes in the first and second examples; the regulation would not be considered a
compensable encroachment on the cattle-rancher’s property. The outcomes may
nevertheless be different in the third and fourth cases, with Epstein curiously
allowing greater latitude to government regulation; assuming that the regulation fits
the problem it seeks to address, it would be considered a compensable taking under
Epstein’s nuisance theory.
156. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations that
governmental regulations place on property rights).
157. EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 5.
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theories; simply put, government many times stands in a unique
position as the efficient regulator of conduct that reduces overall
public welfare, even when it does not amount to a nuisance under
158
traditional private law doctrine.
Moreover, Epstein appears to concede this point, at least in part,
when he moves from an anti-nuisance doctrine based on private
nuisance to one that is based on public nuisance. Despite Epstein’s
159
assertions to the contrary, this move is not trivial; public nuisance is
generally considered to be “an entirely different concept from that of
private nuisance . . . [which is] a much broader term [that]
encompasses much conduct other than the type that interferes with
160
the use and enjoyment of private property.”
The distinction is
predicated on the very theory Epstein seeks to reject—that
government may protect interests that are much broader than those
protected by private law.
The fallacy in Epstein’s portrayal of public nuisance is best
161
demonstrated by Epstein’s analysis of Mugler v. Kansas.
In Mugler,
the Supreme Court upheld a statute that prohibited the manufacture
of alcoholic beverages in Kansas, which the Court found to be a
162
legitimate exercise of that state’s police power.
Notably, although
163
Epstein criticizes the ultimate holding, he does accept the purpose
of the statute—control of the consequences of alcoholism—as within
164
the state’s police power. Arguably, however, there is no remedy for
158. Id. at 36.
159. Epstein argues that “a public nuisance is understood as a wrong against many
individuals, each of whom suffers small compensable harms.” Id. at 112.
160. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90
(5th ed. 1984); see R.F.V. HEUSTON & R.A. BUCKLEY, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 61 (19th ed. 1987) (“Public and private nuisances are not in reality two
species of the same genus at all.”); B.S. MARKESINIS & S.F. DEAKIN, TORT LAW 450
(4th ed. 1999) (“[P]ublic nuisance . . . is an amorphous and unsatisfactory area of
the law covering an ill-assorted collection of wrongs, some of which have little or no
association with tort . . . .”).
161. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
162. See id. at 662 (noting that Kansas was protecting its citizens against the
detrimental effects of alcohol).
163. Epstein argues that the means used by Kansas to attain its purpose were
inappropriate, because theories of proximate causation “only allow an injured party
to reach the immediate supplier of the alcohol.” EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 130.
For this proposition, Epstein relies on Vesely v. Sager, a case in which the plaintiff,
injured by a drunken driver, was allowed to maintain claims against the purveyor who
sold alcoholic beverages to the driver. 486 P.2d 151, 157 (Ca. 1971). In Vesely,
however, the claim against the purveyors of the alcoholic beverages sounded in
negligence based on breach of a specific statutory duty, and not on any notion of
nuisance. See id. at 159–60 (finding that breach of the defendant’s statutorily
imposed duty would create a presumption of negligence).
164. See EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 130 (critiquing the Court regarding its failure
to consider whether the defendants, and not the original producers, were the source
of the public nuisance).
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the citizenry at large from the harmful effects of alcoholism, at least
not under any theory of nuisance; no group of citizens could prevent
purveyors of alcoholic beverages from serving alcohol, unless the
group could show some form of negligence on the part of the
165
purveyors as well as proximate causation of injuries. Thus, a state’s
attempt to control the detrimental effects of alcoholism must be
based on a power that goes beyond the aggregate private law powers
of each citizen. Indeed, the power must be based on a view of public
nuisance that is much broader than, and distinct from, the law of
private nuisance; arguably, it has no clear boundaries other than the
requirement that the regulatory scheme would be overall welfare166
enhancing, i.e., to prevent some public harm. Essentially, this is the
very regulatory latitude the government enjoys under an
167
appropriability analysis and that the Court recognized in Lucas.
The second divergence between Epstein’s theory and the
appropriability analysis concerns instances where the police power is
165. In cases such as Vesely, the reliance on negligence is typically the reason for
rejecting claims against manufacturers as too remote. See EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at
130 n.8. Manufacturers appear to be removed from specific injuries due to the
negligence of several intervening actors: the purchasers of alcoholic beverages, the
purveyors, etc. Id. By contrast, had the common law recognized a right to sue
purveyors of alcohol under a theory of nuisance based on the general effects of
alcoholism, there would be no reason to think that manufacturers would be
considered too remote. Id. at 130–31.
166. Another example of this is the federal government’s prohibition on the
cultivation of hemp. Hemp, a variety of the cannabis Sativa plant, was a popular crop
in the United States for well over a century; it was grown in many plantations
(including George Washington’s and Thomas Jefferson’s) and put to a wide array of
uses, such as making paper, fabrics, ropes, etc. See Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Farmers
Covet a Forbidden Crop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at A22 (discussing how many farmers
think that they could save their farms if they could grow hemp). However, in 1937,
as part of the federal government’s drug policy, Congress enacted the Marihuana
Tax Act of 1937. Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970), which
taxed and regulated the transfer of hemp thereby effectively preventing the viable
continued cultivation of hemp crops. As a result, the value of land on which hemp
was previously grown was undeniably diminished and hemp farmers were forced to
switch to other, less profitable crops. If we were to accept the government’s
rationales for the statute at face value—that hemp is so closely related to marijuana
that its cultivation would impede the government’s war against the trafficking of
marijuana and thereby increase marijuana’s spread in society—then the ends sought
by the statute appear to be well within the police power rationale, even though no
private citizen could have a right to prevent the growth of hemp under any
recognized nuisance rationale.
The statute was ultimately struck down as
unconstitutional in Leary v. United States, after the Supreme Court determined that its
requirement that traffickers of cannabis varieties register with law enforcement
authorities violated the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.
395 U.S. 6, 12 (1969). The prohibition against cultivation of cannabis varieties,
including hemp, can now be found in the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
167. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022 (1992) (observing that
although it did not apply to the instant case, prevention of public harm justifies
governmental regulation of property without requiring compensation).
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used in a way which deprives owners of all substantial economic value
of their property. Under Epstein’s account, such a taking would still
be noncompensable so long as it was a valid operation of the police
168
power.
After all, private nuisances may be prevented through
litigation by private plaintiffs without any need for compensation of
the defendant.
Here, again, the fallacy of the private law analogue is clear.
Injunctive relief is easily justifiable in the limited, and relatively static
context of private nuisance doctrine; an owner has no right to expect,
ex ante, to use her property in a way which amounts to a private
nuisance. The prohibition against such use would be reflected in the
initial price of the property and the owner should not, therefore, be
compensated ex post if and when she is ultimately prevented from
such prohibited use. The risk associated with any given prohibited
use is thus narrowly confined, because the rights of “neighbors”
(whether in land or in other types of property) are generally well
169
delineated.
By contrast, in the amorphous and dynamic realm of
governmental regulation, the risk is not so confined. Governmental
regulation is not merely declarative; it changes the legal situation in
ways that the assertion of imminent private rights does not. Indeed,
the government may limit uses of property for a plethora of reasons
and use a plethora of means to do so.
Take, for example, Epstein’s analysis of Kansas’s right to control
the effects of alcoholism, as discussed in Mugler. Setting aside
Epstein’s proximity-based objections (since Kansas could have
regulated more proximate entities), assume that the regulation
rendered a few manufacturers’ properties unusable, depriving the

168. See EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 111–12 (justifying police power as the sum of
many individuals’ rights).
169. For example, if a cattle rancher contaminates a privately-owned lake for five
years without interruption, the legal system would generally not assume that she
acquired a right to continue the contamination, or that the owner of the lake has
waived her right to seek an injunction against further contamination; she thus
undertakes a calculated risk. Notably, although this proposition represents the
traditional approach of the common law, the equitable nature of injunctive relief has
allowed courts some flexibility on these issues, with some courts moving toward rules
of liability—i.e., the payment of damages—instead of rules of property—
i.e., injunctive relief. This is especially true in cases where the balance of hardships
tilts in the defendant’s direction because of the plaintiff’s own fault in confronting
the nuisance or because of large disparities in the values of the properties
concerned. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315–16 (N.Y. 1970)
(determining whether an injunction was appropriate, given the disparity between the
fact that the defendant company was found to be a nuisance, and the fact that the
defendant invested forty-five million dollars into the company and employed over
three hundred people).
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owners of all economic value.
Clearly, these manufacturers could
not have foreseen this occurrence; any suggestion to the contrary
would be a legal fiction. Although this is a “hard case” under any
analysis, the appropriability analysis’s recognition of such regulation
as tantamount to a taking seems to better comport with the realities
of modern day regulation, whether we refer to it simply as regulation
171
or dress it up in the guise of public nuisance control.
2.

Joseph Sax
At the other end of the spectrum from Epstein, Joseph Sax
proposes a takings theory that allows extensive noncompensable
172
regulation of property.
Sax’s theory is based on extreme nihilism
regarding any notion of “thingness” of property; to Sax, a “spillover”
is any effect of one use on another use, regardless of the relation
173
between such uses and the underlying thing that is owned.
Thus, Sax argues, “[T]o use land in a way that demands silence,
darkness or the absence of smoke on one’s land is similarly to burden
174
the common in air.” Sax considers uses that require freedom from
invasion by others to have spillover effects that are just as detrimental
175
as those of uses that actually do invade the property of others.
170. This is possible, for instance, if the cost of converting the distillery to another
use is greater than the net present value of such alternative use.
171. It should be noted that some regulatory regimes do nothing more than
enforce an aggregation of private rights against nuisance. This phenomenon is most
prominent in zoning regulations that prohibit certain industrial activities in the
midst of a residential area. See EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 131–32 (citing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926)) (discussing the rationale for
upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited commercial development on the
defendant’s property as a valid state exercise of local police power to prevent a public
nuisance). A complete analysis of such cases goes beyond the scope of this paper;
however, it appears safe to assume that subject to some analysis of the expectations of
the affected parties, such regulations should not be considered a compensable taking
under the appropriability analysis even if they do strip the property of most, or all,
value. See EPSTEIN, supra note 134, at 131 (noting that the zoning ordinance reduced
Ambler’s property value by about seventy-five percent).
172. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Spillover Effects, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971) (discussing takings in the context of his nontraditional theory that
property transcends mere physical boundaries).
173. See id. at 161 (differentiating between three different types of spillovers: an
individual’s land use that restricts other people’s use of their own land, use of a
common property that other people have equal rights to use, and land use that
affects the health or well-being of others).
174. Id. at 162.
175. Sax’s position in this paper is based on a notion of property as an
“interdependent network of competing uses” and on the centrality of the concept of
public—as opposed to private—rights. Id. at 150. In an earlier paper, Sax held a
slightly different position, which tended to focus on the role the government was
playing in each regulation, as either a competitor for resources or as a mediator of
conflicts between owners. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36, 62 (1964). Sax’s earlier position had some notions similar to the appropriability
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Based on this expansive definition of spillovers, Sax argues that
owners have a protected right to use their property only inasmuch as
such use has no spillover effects at all, and that any regulation
controlling spillover effects would not be considered a compensable
176
taking.
Sax’s own examples fully demonstrate the difficulties created by
the detachment of use from the underlying thing that is owned.
Sax argues, for example, that the government could, without
compensation, prohibit mining that would result in drainage to
nearby residential lots, just as it could prohibit the residential uses
177
that require freedom from drainage.
By contrast, if the
government had prohibited mining, it could not require that the
abandoned mining strip be converted into a parking lot simply
because the neighbors require it; this would deny the owner other
uses which would have no spillover effects (as defined by Sax) on the
lower-lying lands.
This account appears to be fundamentally flawed. That mining
which is harmful to lower-lying land may be prevented through
regulation is uncontroversial; this would usually not be considered a
reduction of legal appropriability under the appropriability analysis,
and may not even be considered a compensable taking under
Epstein’s account. On the other hand, Sax’s conclusion with regards
to the regulation of adjacent lands that stand to be destroyed is
completely unjustified.
First, as noted before, if the boundaries erected by property law are
to have any significance at all, we cannot say that the freedom from
invasion (in this case physical invasion) is the same as freedom to
invade; as the analysis in Part III demonstrated, freedom from
invasion is the inevitable result of the requirement that
appropriability be ensured.
Second, Sax’s approach offers no real distinction between the
regulation of adjacent lands that would be damaged (which Sax
argues is noncompensable) and the positive requirement that the
analysis proposed here, in that to some extent it was concerned with the question of
who enjoys the benefits of regulation. Sax did little by way of justifying the
distinction between the different roles of government, and the theory was never fully
developed in this direction.
176. See Sax, supra note 172, at 162 (“Any demand of a right to use property that
has spillover effects . . . may constitutionally be restrained, however severe the
economic loss on the property owner, without any compensation being required . . .
.”).
177. See id. at 152–53 (characterizing neither prohibition as superior to the other,
and noting that prohibiting either action would result in a taking of the other
property).
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upper-lying land be used as a parking lot instead of a mine (which
Sax argues is compensable). In essence, a regulation that prohibits
residential development and approves mining effectively requires
owners of lower-lying lands to use their property as a vessel for
containing the acid drainage; there is no distinction between that
and a requirement that the upper-lying land be used as a vessel for
parked cars. Both the acid drainage and the cars are arguably
178
spillovers.
Ultimately, Sax’s nihilism is self-defeating, and cannot
serve as an alternative to the Supreme Court’s approach, or to the
appropriability analysis that informs it.
3.

Frank I. Michelman
In a seminal paper in takings scholarship, Frank Michelman offers
both utilitarian and fairness-based, Rawlsian analyses of the takings
179
problem.
In his utilitarian analysis, Michelman emphasizes the
Benthamian notion of expectations, which is closely related to
appropriability, and ultimately concludes that a utilitarian approach
would require compensation in situations where “to [not]
compensate would be critically demoralizing [in terms of costs to
180
expectations]; otherwise, not.” Michelman then goes on to suggest
that the need for compensation, under a utilitarian regime, must
arise out of some distinction between perceptions of majoritarian
arbitrariness (which are compensable, at least in some instances) and
naturally-occurring “accidents” (which, as a general rule, are dealt
181
Michelman then examines
with through insurance mechanisms).
how the common rules of decision developed by the courts—rules
predicated on physical invasion, diminution of value, or a distinction
182
between harms and benefits—fare under these analyses.
Most relevant to our discussion, when discussing the diminution of
value test, Michelman notices that “the test poses not nearly so loose
178. The fact that the first regulation is phrased as a negative prohibition
(no residential development) and the latter as a positive requirement (build a
parking lot) is completely arbitrary; the former may be phrased as a requirement
(use your land in way X which allows for drainage) and the latter may be phrased as
a negative prohibition (for example, no interference with the flow of cars).
179. Michelman, supra note 142, at 1219 (outlining Rawls’ theory that social
arrangements are fair where inequality between individuals is considered
acceptable).
180. Id. at 1213.
181. Id. at 1217 (concluding that people perceive that “the force of a majority is
self-determining and purposive, as compared with [accidents,] . . . which seem to be
randomly generated”; people can cope with “random uncertainty” but “remain on
edge when contemplating . . . strategically determined losses”).
182. See id. at 1233 (noting that precedent appears to call for an arbitrary decision
about the extent to which a given property must be devalued, likely somewhere
between fifty and one hundred percent, to require compensation).
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a question of degree . . . [but rather] whether or not the measure in
question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant
of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed
183
expectation.”
Michelman, whose focus is on takings—and not property rights at
large—does little to ascertain just what these “distinctly perceived”
expectations amount to, but he does seem to realize that such
184
expectations exist.
It is at this very juncture, I believe, that legal
appropriability should enter the equation. Property regimes form
the expectations of owners with regard to the rights they have in
connection with their assets; legal appropriability is the purpose of
such regimes, and thus defines and delineates (or should define and
should delineate) owners’ expectations.
Legal appropriability
recognizes not only the necessity to internalize benefits, but also to
control negative spillovers through regulation. As such, it gives an
attenuated answer to the question of the content of expectations
created by property: it not only tells owners what to expect, but also
what not to expect. Under its auspices, owners should expect to
enjoy the fruits of the legitimately chosen use of their property.
Owners should also expect that their use of private property may be
curtailed, within reasonable boundaries and given the prevailing
constitutional principles, to the extent that such uses have harmful
spillover effects. However, owners should generally not expect to
dedicate their property to the public, i.e., to essentially be altogether
deprived of their property (or its economic value).
Although the takings problem may require some flexible, equitable
principle that will help resolve hard cases, the notion of
appropriability, and the expectations it creates, should clearly guide
such a solution. It is legal appropriability that should ultimately
define not only what property is, but also when a redistribution that
affects its value would be considered “critically demoralizing.”
This understanding seems to underlie the Supreme Court’s takings
analysis, as reflected in Lucas.
CONCLUSION
The role of appropriability in property analysis is more than
analytic. Appropriability analysis has an institutional aspect; it can
and should be used to tailor relatively clear rules of decision
regarding the scope of property rights. Such rules, if properly
183. Id. at 1233.
184. See id. at 1213 n.97 (observing only that not all expectations are justified).
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constructed, would make short shrift of most property cases, and
would give considerable guidance to courts in hard cases.
By comparison, alternative rules seem not only less reasoned, but also
less workable. A rule that would protect any and all uses of private
property, for example, would clearly create inefficiencies, due to the
problem of negative externalities. Such a rule would also give no
guidance on solving cases of competing uses. As a result, as
demonstrated in the discussion of Epstein’s analysis of takings, such a
rule would end up with so many exceptions that it would lose any
practical significance; courts would not be able to determine, in a
given case, whether they should apply the rule or an exception
thereto.
Similarly, a rule that would protect only efficient uses—for
example, a Coasean rule that would attempt to replicate the results of
arms-length contractual negotiations in every case—would be
prohibitively costly to administer. Such a rule would require courts to
delve into extensive inquiries regarding the costs and benefits of any
given purported use in every single case. With the exception of a
185
small number of extreme cases, courts are clearly not adept at
performing these types of inquiries for a multiplicity of reasons: their
fact-intensive nature, the broad policy rationales that they implicate,
and where negative externalities are involved (or alleged), the lack of
adequate representation of the implicated interests in the framework
186
of an adversarial trial.
Appropriability, by contrast, calls for a return to traditional rules
that have been tested in courts for centuries. Indeed, many of the
concepts and rules that have been undermined or deserted because
of the shift to the bundle of rights model can be re-evaluated and, in
many cases, resurrected using the appropriability analysis. Notably,
however, legal appropriability is not simply a reactionary concept.
Instead, it offers a nuanced property analysis that is informed by, and
can many times bridge the gap between, traditional and modern
property scholarship.

185. The most typical example of such uses are those that amount to a common
law tort, such as the private nuisance example discussed earlier in Part V.B.
However, even these cases are susceptible to exceptions and exceptions-toexceptions.
186. This is just another facet of the transaction costs problem that prevents
contracting between the relevant parties. This is the same problem that was pointed
out in Part III.B’s discussion of numerosity.

